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Abstract
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Orga-
nizations Act (RICO) by examining the history of common law conspiracy, the legislative back-
ground of RICO, and the evolution of the RICO enterprise through court decisions. Part I also
examines laws in Italy and France prohibiting criminal associations. Part II analyzes Reves v.
Ernst & Young and its test for determining participation in a RICO association-in-fact enterprise.
Part III argues that the legislative history of RICO, the role RICO plays in federal criminal law,
and the functional similarity of criminal association laws abroad demonstrate that peripheral as-
sociates should be liable as members of a RICO association-in-fact enterprise. The most effective
and unambiguous method of interpreting RICO would require that membership in an association-
in-fact be based on the intent and actions of a participant rather than on a managerial role in an
organizational hierarchy. The language of the RICO statute, the legislative history, and analogous
provisions in foreign criminal codes call for a more expansive reading of RICO. This Comment
concludes that applying an inclusive definition of RICO to people who participate in patterns of
racketeering activity with the requisite mens rea, mental state, would best carry out Congress’
intent to attack racketeering and criminal organizations.
COMMENT
MARGINS OF THE MOB: A COMPARISON OF REVES v.
ERNST & YOUNG WITH CRIMINAL ASSOCIATION LAWS IN
ITALY AND FRANCE
AlexanderD. Tripp*
What are gangs of thieves but small kingdoms? The gangs too
are made up of men, under the authority of a leader, joined
by a common agreement, dividing their plunder according to
established rules.1
INTRODUCTION
Congress created the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
ganizations Act' ("RICO") as part of a broad attack on enterprise
criminality' through the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
("OCCA") .4 By attacking the organizational structure that un-
derlies criminal enterprises,5 Congress directed RICO not only
* J.D. Candidate, 1997, Fordham University.
1. 4 SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD § iv. (Translation by Comment author).
2. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970 Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68 (1996)).
3. See G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions (RICO): Basic Concepts - Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1013-14
(1980) (describing enterprise criminality as comprising all types of organized criminal
behavior from political corruption to white collar crime and Mafia activity).
4. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901, 84 Stat. 922
(1970); see Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985) (describing Racket-
eer Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO") as new method of fighting crime);
Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26-29 (1983) (finding in RICO's legislative his-
tory intent to make broad assault on organized crime and its economic foundation);
United States v. Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 900 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953
(1978) (stating RICO has displaced traditional methods of fighting organized criminal
activity); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM.
L. RrN'. 661, 666-85 (1987) (examining legislative history of RICO).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). Congress defined a RICO enterprise as "any individual,
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity." Id.; see Gerard E. Lynch,
RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87 COLUM. L. Ray. 920, 948-71
(1987) (criticizing broad definition of RICO enterprise); Blakey & Gettings supra note
3, at 1023-28 (describing new remedies in RICO for enterprise criminality); Michael
Goldsmith, RICO and Enterprise Criminality: A Response to Gerard E. Lynch, 88 COLUM. L.
REV. 774, 774-75 (1988) (describing RICO as attack on organizational stru ture of crim-
inal groups).
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at criminal groups,6 but at crimes committed against organiza-
tions or committed by means of an organization.7 Consequently,
the RICO enterprise is a key component of a RICO prosecution,
and individual liability for a RICO violation hinges on a defend-
ant's affiliation with the enterprise.8 In a conspiracy, the con-
spiratorial agreement ties together the group of conspirators,9
but a racketeer associates with a RICO enterprise through a
more flexible connection."0 In Italy and France, criminal as-
sociations, like conspiracies, are criminal groups, and like RICO
enterprises, they involve an organization beyond mere agree-
ment or common purpose."
In common law countries, conspiracy laws have been the
government's traditional weapon against criminal groups.' 2 A
criminal agreement, however, is not an essential element of a
RICO violation,' 3 and alleging a RICO violation may be more
effective than conspiracy at reaching all the members of a crimi-
6. Elliott, 571 F.2d 900-02.
7. Thomas S. O'Neill, Note, Functions of the RICO Enterprise Concept, 64 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 646, 674-77 (1989).
8. See David M. Ludwick, Restricting RICO: Narrowing the Scope of Enterprise, 2 COR-
NELLJ.L. & PUB. POL'Y 381, 387 (1993) (describing enterprise as limit on application of
RICO). Congress structured the statute to avoid constitutional problems with criminal-
izing membership in an organization. Id.
9. See WAYNE R. LAFAvE & AUSTIN W. Sco-r, JR., HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAw 460-
63 (1972) (describing conspiratorial agreement as all-important).
10. See James F. Holderman, Reconciling RICO's Conspiracy and "Group" Enterprise
Concepts with Traditional Conspiracy Doctrine, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 385 (1983) (discussing
relation of RICO to conspiracy law); Note, The RICO Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible"
Linkage, 83 MICH. L. RE,'. 571, 573-75 (1984) [hereinafter RICO News Requirement]
(describing necessary connection between racketeering activity and RICO enterprise).
11. See Marcel Culioli, Association de Malfaiteurs, in 1 REPERTOIRE DE DROIT PENAL ET
DE PROCEDURE PtNALE 8 (Dalloz, 2d ed. 1996) (discussing disappearance of strucutral
requirements for criminal association and necessity for commencement of execution of
target offense); Wienczyslaw J. Wagner, Conspiracy in Civil Law Countries, 42 J. CRIM. L.
CRIM. & POL. Sci. 171, 172 (1951) (describing French criminal association as not com-
parable with common law conspiracy); 7 MANZINI, TRATrATO DI DiRiTrO PENALE
ITALiANO 193-95 (Gian Domenico Pisapia ed., 5th ed. 1983) (discussing structural re-
quirements for Italian criminal association).
12. See IAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 460 (describing conspiracy as sanction
against group activity); Ian H. Dennis, The Rationale of Criminal Conspiracy, 93 LAw Q.
REv. 39, 43 (1977) (discussing common law justifications for conspiracy laws); Note,
Federal Treatment of Multiple Conspiracies, 57 COLUM. L. REv. 387, 387 (1957) (describing
growing use of conspiracy indictments paralleling growth of organized crime).
13. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902; Lynch, supra note 5, at 953-55. Conspiracies extend
only as far as the conspiratorial agreement, while a RICO enterprise is a functional unit
not limited by the need to show a particular agreement. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902. A
conspiratorial agreement to violate a substantive portion of RICO, however, limits a
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nal organization.14 Through 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), RICO applies
to groups formed for criminal purposes, such as the Mafia,15 and
to people who manipulate preexisting organizations, such as in-
surance companies, 16 for criminal purposes.
The Supreme Court's decision in Reves v. Ernst & Young'7
restricted liability under § 1962(c) to people who commit racke-
teering crimes while operating or managing a RICO enter-
prise." Under the operation or management test of Reves, the
Supreme Court has limited the effective scope of the RICO en-
terprise and curtailed the broad liability envisioned by Con-
gress.19 The Court's decision, however, has not entirely fore-
closed a broad application of RICO liability or eliminated the
potential liability of people on the periphery of RICO enter-
prises."
In Italy and France, criminal groups are prosecuted under
laws prohibiting criminal associations." The Italian and French
RICO conspiracy. See Holderman, supra note 10, at 393-403 (describing courts applying
traditional conspiracy notions to RICO conspiracy).
14. See United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1359, 1396-409 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(discussing RICO broadening requirements for joint criminal activity and limiting Rule
8(b) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding joinder of parties); O'Neill,
supra note 7, at 680-95 (discussing party joinder under RICO).
15. E.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct.
1645 (1994).
16. E.g., Aetna Casualty Sur. Co. v. P & B Autobody, 43 F.3d 1546, 1558-60 (1st Cir.
1994).
17. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
18. Id. at 185; Michael Vitiello, More Noise from the Tower of Babel: Making "Sense" out
of Reves v. Ernst & Young, 56 OHIo ST. LJ. 1363, 1387-1411 (1995); CarrieJ. DiSanto,
Note, Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Supreme Court's Enigmatic Attempt to Limit Outsider
Liability Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1059, 1068-70 (1996); Brian
T. Camp, Dual Construction of RICO: The Road Not Taken in Reves, 51 WASH. & LEE L.
REv. 61, 77-79, 93-95 (1994); Ira H. Raphaelson & Michelle D. Bernard, RICO and the
"Operation or Management" Test: The Potential Chilling Effect on Criminal Prosecutions, 28 U.
RICH. L. REv. 669, 686-99; Catherine M. Clarkin, Note, Reves v. Ernst & Young: The
Elimination of Professional Liability under RICO, 43 CATH. U.L. REv. 1025, 1062-68 (1994).
Reves was a civil suit, brought under civil provisions of RICO. Reves, 507 U.S. at 175-76.
The civil and criminal substantive provisions are identical. 18 U.S.C. § 1962; see Blakey
& Gettings, supra note 3, at 1013-21 (describing legislative history of RICO and private
enforcement mechanisms); 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan)
(comparing RICO civil enforcement actions to antitrust laws).
19. See Raphaelson & Bernard, supra note 18, at 671, 698-99 (criticizing Reves re-
striction on RICO liability).
20. See Vitiello, supra note 18, at 1387-98 (describing lower courts' interpretations
of Reves).
21. CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 416 (It.); CODE PENAL [C. PtN.] art. 450-1 to 450-3
(Fr.). The criminal codes of many civil law countries have provisions against criminal
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statutes criminalize participation in criminal organizations and
are similar to RICO association-in-fact illicit enterprises
2 2
While, over time, France's criminal association laws have taken
on many features of common law conspiracy, 5 Italy has retained
a traditional definition of criminal association. 4 The Italian
Supreme Court has recently expanded the reach of criminal as-
sociation laws by allowing prosecutors to link the complicity stat-
ute 25 with the statute prohibiting Mafia association2 6 and to pros-
ecute people outside the criminal group as accomplices of the
organization.2
7
Part I of this Comment discusses the background of RICO
by examining the history of common law conspiracy, the legisla-
tive background of RICO, and the evolution of the RICO enter-
prise through court decisions. Part I also examines laws in Italy
and France prohibiting criminal associations. Part II analyzes
Reves v. Ernst & Young and its test for determining participation
in a RICO association-in-fact enterprise. Part III argues that the
legislative history of RICO, the role RICO plays in federal crimi-
nal law, and the functional similarity of criminal association laws
abroad demonstrate that peripheral associates should be liable
as members of a RICO association-in-fact enterprise. The most
effective and unambiguous method of interpreting RICO would
require that membership in an association-in-fact be based on
associations. E.g., PENAL CODE OF BELGIUM art. 322; PENAL CODE OF ETHIOPIA art. 472;
STRAFGESETZBUCH art. 129 (F.R.G.); PENAL CODE OF MONACO arts. 241-44; PENAL CODE
OF PORTUGAL art. 263; PENAL CODE OF TURKEY art. 313.
22. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). A RICO enterprise is "any individual, partnership, corpo-
ration, association, or other legal entity and any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. An association-in-fact must have a structure
distinct from the racketeering activity and must function as a continuing unit. United
States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). An Italian criminal association must have
at least three members, a structure sufficient to commit the target crimes, and must
plan an open-ended series of crimes. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 195-96. A French
criminal association must consist of at least two members who form a group, agree to
act together to commit one or more crimes, and commit at least one overt act in prepa-
ration for committing a target crime. Andr6 Vitu, Participation d une Association de
Malfaiteurs, in 3 JURIs-CLASSEUR PNAL 5-6 (1996).
23. See Culioli, supra note 11 at 8 (describing French law basing criminal associa-
tion on criminal agreement).
24. 7 MANZINI, supra, note 11, at 194-97.
25. C.P. 110 (It.).
26. C.P. 416bis (It.).
27. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Unite
Penali, in 1995 FORO IT. II, 422. In Italy, people who are not members of the Mafia can
now be convicted of aiding and abetting the Mafia. Id.
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the intent and actions of a participant rather than on a manage-
rial role in an organizational hierarchy. The language of the
RICO statute, the legislative history, and analogous provisions in
foreign criminal codes call for a more expansive reading of
RICO. This Comment concludes that applying an inclusive defi-
nition of RICO to people who participate in patterns of racke-
teering activity with the requisite mens rea, mental state, would
best carry out Congress' intent to attack racketeering and crimi-
nal organizations.
I. RICO, CONSPIRACY AND CRIMINAL ASSOCIATION
A RICO enterprise is not confined by a conspiratorial agree-
ment, for it can encompass a broad array of activities and in-
clude people beyond the scope of a single agreement."' Liability
under RICO does not require that one join a group of
criminals29 as does a criminal association."0 Liability for a RICO
violation, instead, can extend to a person outside the enterprise
who joins, manipulates, or preys upon the organization.3 1
A. U.S., Italian, and French Laws Against Criminal Groups
Both common law countries and civil law countries have
laws that criminalize participation in a criminal group.32 Con-
spiracy is a product of Anglo-American common law and does
not exist in Italy or France,33 while RICO is a U.S. statute passed
by Congress because of specific concerns about the threat of or-
28. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902.
29. See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 654-78 (discussing roles of RICO enterprise).
Under § 1962(c), an enterprise may be the victim of a racketeer. See, e.g., Sun Say. &
Loan Ass'n v. Dierdorff, 825 F.2d 187, 189-90, 195 (9th Cir. 1987) (evidencing bank
president conducting affairs of bank through pattern of racketeering). An enterprise
may also be a group of racketeers. See, e.g., United States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 929-31
(convicting defendant John Gotti of running and conspiring to run Gambino Organ-
ized Crime Family of La Cosa Nostra).
30. See 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 195 (describing requirement that members
voluntarily join Italian criminal association); Vitu, supra note 22, at 6-7 (describing act
of joining French criminal association).
31. See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 673-78 (discussing roles of RICO enterprise).
32. See supra note 21 (listing civil law countries with laws prohibiting criminal
groups). Common law countries have generally used conspiracy laws against criminal
groups. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 Comment at 96-102 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960)
(discussing rationales for conspiracy laws); LAFAvE & Sco-rr, supra note 9, at 460
(describing conspiracy used against criminal groups);
33. See Wagner, supra note 11, at 171 (discussing absence of conspiracy laws in civil
law countries).
19961
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ganized crime to the U.S. economy.3 4 The original nineteenth
century Italian and French laws against criminal associations ap-
plied to rural bandits, but have since undergone successive mod-
ifications.35
In common-law countries, prosecutors have traditionally
used conspiracy laws to attack criminal groups.3 6 A conspiracy,
however, is based on an agreement to commit a criminal act,
rather than on an explicit prohibition against forming a criminal
group.37 The more intricate schemes of large criminal organiza-
tions were often too complex to be reduced to the agreement
required for a conspiracy prosecution,38 and the shortcomings
of conspiracy led Congress to develop the broader notions of
34. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 498.
35. See 7 MANZINI supra note 11, at 191-98 (discussing history of Italian laws against
criminal association); Culioli, supra note 11, at 4-7 (describing history of French laws
against criminal association).
36. LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 9, at 460; James Alexander Burke & Sanford H.
Kadish, Conspiracy, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 231, 231 (Sanford H. Kad-
ish ed., 1983); Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of
Individual Defendants, 62 HARV. L. REv. 276, 277 (1948). Between 1914 and 1920, states
and the federal Government enacted criminal syndicalism statutes aimed at subversive
organizations. See ELDRIDGE FOSTER DOWELL, A HISTORY OF CRIMINAL SYNDICALISM LEG-
ISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 13-20 (1939) (surveying historical background of fed-
eral and state criminal syndicalism statutes); Marc Rohr, Communists and the First Amend-
ment: The Shaping of Freedom of Advocacy in the Cold War Era, 28 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 1-30
(1991) (discussing history of statutes prohibiting membership in subversive organiza-
tions and their effect on American Communist Party); Martin Gendel, Comment, Crimi-
nal Law: Criminal Syndicalism: Red Flag Law: History of Enforcement in California, 19 CAL.
L. REv. 64, 64-69 (1931) (discussing history and criticisms of California Criminal Syndi-
calism law); Comment, Criminal Law: Criminal Syndicalist Act: Constitutional Law: Valid-
ity of the Act Under the Free Speech Clause, 10 CAL. L. REV. 512, 512-18 (1922) (describing
justifications for criminal syndicalism statutes); see, e.g., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357, 371 (1927) (upholding California Criminal Syndicalism Act); Burns v. United
States, 274 U.S. 328, 336 (1927) (affirming conviction for violation of California Crimi-
nal Syndicalism statute by International Workers of World delegate soliciting members
in Yosemite National Park); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448-49 (1969) (overrul-
ing Whitney and striking down Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Statute).
In the Omnibus Crime Bill of 1994, Congress enhanced sentences for any street
gang member convicted of certain enumerated felonies who had a prior conviction for
certain enumerated crimes. 18 U.S.C § 521 (1995); see David A. Anderson, Note, Jail,
Jail, The Gang's All Here: Senate Crime Bill Section 521, The Criminal Street Gang Provision, 36
B.C. L. RE,. 527, 544-50 (1995) (discussing constitutionality of federal laws against
street gangs).
37. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, at 96, 100 (describing foreign codes,
unlike conspiracy, explicitly prohibiting formation of criminal groups).
38. United States v. Griffin, 660 F.2d 996, 999-1000 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1156 (1981); Elliott, 571 F.2d at 900-03.
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criminal combinations embodied in RICO.39
1. Conspiracy
At common law, a conspiracy was an agreement with an-
other person to commit a crime or unlawful act.40 Criminal laws
traditionally required that the accused commit the criminal act,
actus reus, with the proper mental state, mens rea.41 In a conspir-
acy, a person commits the criminal act by forming the conspira-
torial agreement. 41 One must also have the corresponding mens
rea and form the conspiratorial agreement intentionally, while
intending to commit the target crime.43 Criminal liability for
conspiracy extends to everyone, including peripheral members
of a group, who was a party to the conspiratorial agreement.'
a. Types of Conspiracies
To illustrate the relationship of co-conspirators, prosecutors
often use models to represent the structure of a criminal organi-
zation. 4 ' The models may link the participants as co-conspira-
tors in a single, complex conspiracy, 46 or distinguish small con-
39. Griffin, 660 F.2d at 999-1000; Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902.
40. See Commonwealth v. Hunt, 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 111, 116-19 (1842) (describing
history of conspiracy laws, and defining conspiracy as confederacy to commit unlawful
act or lawful act for unlawful purpose); LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 460-63
(describing conspiratorial agreement extending to tacit understandings inferred from
defendants' actions); Note, Developments in the Law: Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L.
REv. 920, 922 (1959) [hereinafter Developments] (stating that agreement itself is crimi-
nal).
41. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 250-52 (1952); Matthew T. Fricker &
Kelly Gilchrist, Comment, United States v. Nofziger and the Revision qf 18 U.S.C. § 207:
The Need for a New Approach to the Mens Rea Requirements of Federal Criminal Law, 65 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 803, 812-13 (1990).
42. Burke & Kadish, supra note 36, at 232-33; Developments, supra note 40, at 925-26.
Under the plurality requirement, there must be at least two people who share the intent
and form the agreement. LAFAVE & Scor, supra note 9, at 488-90. Under the unilat-
eral approach, however, the criminal intent of one person is enough, and if the other
co-conspirator is, for example, an undercover police officer and does not actually have
the requisite intent, the lone defendant may nevertheless be convicted. Id.
43. Developments, supra note 40, at 925-26.
44. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645 reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 818 (1946);
see Phillip E.Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CALIF. L. RE'. 1137, 1143-
44 (1973) (criticizing Pinkerton doctrine making co-conspirators into accomplices).
45. LAFA E & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 480-82.
46. Id. These figures, however, are not legal requirements, and a sprawling group
with interdependent members can constitute a conspiracy even if it does not conform
precisely to the wheel or chain models. United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 57-64 (5th
Cir. 1974).
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spiracies in overlapping criminal networks.47 The two major
models are based on wheels48 and chains,4 9 respectively.
In a wheel conspiracy,50 a central person or group acts as a
hub for peripheral members of the conspiracy who are arrayed
as spokes around the central figure. 51 To be one large conspir-
acy instead of a series of smaller conspiracies, the spokes must
have a conspiratorial agreement that links the participants as a
rim links the spokes of a wheel.52
In Kotteakos v. United States,5 3 a conspiracy case brought
before the Supreme Court in 1946, the hub was Simon Brown, a
broker who obtained fraudulent federal housing loans for 32
other people. 4 The Supreme Court determined that the other
conspirators were peripheral spokes, linked only to Brown and
not to each other.5 5 Because there was no agreement linking the
unconnected members and, therefore, no rim on the wheel, the
conspiracy was incomplete. 56 Instead of a single conspiracy in-
volving numerous coconspirators, there were several small, in-
dependent conspiracies, each of which included Brown as a
member.5 7
Chain conspiracies consist of interdependent parties whose
47. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 754-55 (1946).
48. Kotteakos, 328 U.S at 754-55.
49. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 558 (1947).
50. See Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 754-55 (describing requirement of single agreement
as rim to join multiple conspirators).
51. LAFAxrE & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 479-82.
52. Id. at 481.
53. 328 U.S. 750.
54. Id. at 753.
55. Id. at 755. The Court found, "[t]he proof.. . made out a case, not of a single
conspiracy, but of several." Id. If the facts establish multiple conspiracies when the
indictment charged a single, large conspiracy, the material variance with the indictment
is reversible error if the defendants show that it affected their substantial rights. Id. at
755-56. If the Government indicts several defendants under multiple conspiracy counts
and the indictment fails to allege facts sufficient to constitute a single conspiracy that
would justify joint prosecution, the court must sever the trials. United States v. Lane,
584 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1978). If, despite the insufficiency of the indictment, the
court refuses to sever the trials, the defendants are entitled to a new trial regardless of
whether or not they can show prejudice, because misjoinder under Rule 8(b) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is inherently prejudicial. United States v. Suther-
land, 656 F.2d 1181, 1190 n.6 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 755. The Court found, "[t]he proof... made out a case,
not of a single conspiracy, but of several." Id.
57. Id.
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crimes require participation in a larger group.5" In Blumenthal v.
United States59 the owner of a wholesale liquor agency conspired
with two men who had agreements with bar owners to sell liquor
at illegal prices.60 The wholesalers knew that the conspiracy had
to extend beyond the middleman, and the bar owners knew the
middleman had to acquire the liquor from other conspirators.6"
The nature of the conspiracy required that the parties know that
the entire conspiracy was larger than the immediate agreements
in which they were involved.62 The co-conspirators, therefore,
had agreed to a single, large conspiracy.63 In Blumenthal all the
parties joined a single conspiracy made up of the interdepen-
dent members.64
b. Accomplice Liability
In addition to liability for the conspiracy itself, prosecutors
can hold conspirators liable for substantive offenses committed
by co-conspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy.65 A conspir-
acy may link all the members of a criminal organization to the
crimes of the individual members, transforming co-conspirators
into accomplices.66 In addition, a person who is not a co-con-
spirator can aid and abet a conspiracy yet not become a party to
the conspiratorial agreement.67
58. See United States v. Bruno, 105 F.2d 921 (2d Cir.), rev'd on other grounds 308
U.S. 287 (1939) (holding sufficient community of interest between narcotics smugglers
in New York, distributors, and retailers in New York, Texas, and Louisiana to constitute
single conspiracy); LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 480-81 (describing differences
between conspiratorial chains and wheels).
59. 332 U.S. 539 (1947).
60. Id. at 542-46.
61. Id. at 554-59.
62. Id. at 559.
63. Id. The Court could infer an agreement to participate in the larger scheme
because the defendants knew of the essential features and broad scope of the conspir-
acy. Id.
64. Id. Unlike a wheel conspiracy, every link in the chain was necessary, and "[b]y
their separate agreements ... [the conspirators] became parties to the larger common
plan, joined together by their knowledge of its essential features and broad scope ...
and by their common single goal." Id. at 558.
65. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946).
66. See Developments, supra note 40, at 998-99 (discussing Pinkerton and vicarious
liability).
67. See LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 9, at 462-63 (describing aid to conspiracy as
making achievement of criminal objective more probable); Cameron R. Williams, Com-
ment, Complicity in a Conspiracy as an Approach to Conspiratorial Liability, 16 UCLA L. REv.
155, 158 (1965) (discussing relation of complicity theory to conspiracy); Susan W. Bren-
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In Pinkerton v. United States,68 the Supreme Court held that a
member of a conspiracy is responsible for all the acts that the
conspiracy planned, or for those that were foreseeable conse-
quences of the conspiratorial agreement.69 Under the Pinkerton
doctrine, courts treat co-conspirators as accomplices.7 ° Each ac-
complice is liable for all acts committed by any other co-conspir-
ator in furtherance of the conspiracy, regardless of individual
involvement in the substantive crimes.71 Walter and Daniel Pin-
kerton were bootleggers convicted of evading liquor taxes.7 2 In
addition to the conspiracy conviction, Daniel Pinkerton was also
convicted of substantive offenses in which he did not partici-
pate.73 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, described the
conspiracy as a "partnership in crime, " 74 and held Daniel Pinker-
ton liable for actions taken by Walter Pinkerton, his co-conspira-
ner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton Liability to RICO Actions,
56 Mo. L. REv. 931 (1991) (discussing historical development of link between conspir-
acy and complicity). The accomplice is responsible for the crimes the primary party
committed. Id. Because conspiracy does not merge into the substantive offense and is
a crime in itself, a conspiracy charge added to the charge for the substantive offense
may act as an aggravating punishment for group crimes. GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINK-
ING CRIMINAL LAw 647 (1978).
68. 328 U.S. 640 (1946).
69. Id.
70. LAFAVE & ScoTr supra note 9, at 513.
71. Id. at 647. In drug conspiracy sentences under the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, a court calculates individual sentences based on the total volume of drugs sold.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IB1 3(a)(2) (1996). Therefore, under the Pin-
kerton doctrine, a peripheral member of a drug conspiracy can be sentenced for the
total volume of drugs sold during the course of the conspiracy. See, e.g., United States v.
Blankenship, 970 F.2d 283, 288 (7th Cir. 1992) (reversing conviction of conspirator
who accepted $100 for rental of trailer to cook drugs and was convicted of conspiracy to
manufacture and distribute methamphetamine and sentenced to ten years without pos-
sibility of parole).
72. Pinkerton v. United States, 151 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1945), affd, 328 U.S. 640
(1946). In addition to the conspiracy conviction, Daniel Pinkerton was convicted on
some of the substantive counts of unlawfully removing, depositing, and concealing whis-
key. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals inferred a conspiracy from the proximity of
the two brothers' houses, the frequent association between the brothers, the numerous
times courts had convicted both brothers of violating liquor laws, a confrontation in
which Walter drew a gun on investigators and threatened to kill the sheriff searching
Daniel's farm, and the occasions on which Daniel posted bond when Walter had been
arrested on state charges in Fayatte County, Alabama. Id.
73. Id. at 646-48; see supra, note 72 (discussing Daniel Pinkerton's substantive con-
victions). Daniel was incarcerated at the time Walter committed some of the substan-
tive offenses. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 500.
74. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644. Justice Douglas adapted Justice Holmes' statement
in United States v. Kissel, "[a] conspiracy is a partnership in criminal purposes." 218 U.S.
601, 608 (1910).
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tor.7
5
While conspiracy is conclusive regarding complicity among
co-conspirators, 76 accomplices who are outside the conspirato-
rial agreement may either aid and abet the conspiracy or be-
come co-conspirators by their acts. Commentators suggest that
one cannot aid and abet a conspiracy because the essence of a
conspiracy is the agreement and that by aiding a conspiracy, one
becomes a party to the agreement and therefore a co-conspira-
tor.78 Only by aiding the formation of a conspiratorial agree-
ment may one aid and abet a conspiracy."
In United States v. Falcone,8 0 however, the Supreme Court im-
plicitly acknowledged the possibility of aiding and abetting a
conspiracy.81 The defendants in Falcone sold ingredients for
bootleg liquor to distributors who supplied illicit distillers.8 2
The indictment charged the suppliers with being parties to the
conspiracy among the distillers, but did not allege that the sup-
pliers actually knew of the conspiracy.83 Based on the insuffi-
ciency of the proof, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction
of the suppliers for aiding and abetting a conspiracy, but never-
theless acknowledged that it was theoretically possible to aid and
abet a conspiracy without becoming a co-conspirator.8 4
Direct Sales Co. v. United States"5 represents another view of
complicity86 with a conspiracy.8 7 Direct Sales Company, a mail
order drug manufacturer and wholesaler, supplied John Victor
Tate, a doctor in Calhoun Falls, South Carolina with vast
75. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 640-41; see Pinkerton, 151 F.2d at 499 (discussing Daniel
Pinkerton's substantive convictions).
76. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 640-41.
77. Williams, supra note 67, at 158-66. Under 18 U.S.C. § 2, however, an aider and
abettor is liable as a principal, and aiding and abetting a conspiracy subjects a defend-
ant to the same punishment as a conspirator. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205,
208 (1940).
78. Id. at 159; Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
79. Developments, supra note 40, at 934.
80. 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
81. Id.; LAFAVE & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 462-63.
82. Falcone, 311 U.S. at 206-07.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 210-11.
85. 319 U.S. 703 (1943).
86. See BLACK's LAw DicriONARY 285 (6th ed. 1990) (defining complicity as "[a]
state of being an accomplice; participation in guilt.").
87. See Williams, supra note 67, at 156-61 (discussing differing approaches to com-
plicity with conspiracy in Falcone and Direct Sales).
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amounts of morphine sulfate.8" The doctor and three others
were charged with conspiring to violate the Harrison Narcotic
Act.89 The Government charged that Direct Sales Company
must have known of a conspiracy involving Dr. Tate based on the
enormous quantities of morphine that Direct Sales Company en-
couraged a rural doctor to buy.90 Instead of charging Direct
Sales Company with aiding and abetting Dr. Tate's conspiracy,
prosecutors charged Direct Sales Company with belonging to a
single, large conspiracy involving Direct Sales Company, Dr.
Tate, and Dr. Tate's illicit distributors of morphine.9" The
Supreme Court upheld the conviction of Direct Sales Company
and distinguished Falcone based on the innocuous and legal
bootlegging ingredients and because the circumstances of the
sale in Falcone did not directly lead to the inference that suppli-
ers knew of the bootlegging conspiracy among the purchasers.92
In Direct Sales, the restrictions on the sale of narcotics and the
circumstances of the voluminous sales allowed the jury to infer
that Direct Sales Company knew that Dr. Tate was disposing of
the morphine illegally.93 The circumstances of the sales also in-
dicated that Direct Sales Company intended to participate in the
88. United States v. Direct Sales Co., 44 F. Supp 623, 624 (W.D.S.C.), affd, 131
F.2d 835 (4th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). Between December 1937 and
January 1940, Direct Sales Co. shipped Dr. Tate 79,000 one-half grain tablets of mor-
phine sulphate. Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 131 F.2d 835, 836 (4th Cir. 1942),
aff'd, 319 U.S. 703 (1943). One-eighth grain or one-quarter grain were the usual doses
for medical uses of morphine. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 707 n.5. An average physician
purchased 200-400 one-quarter grain tablets a year. Direct Sales, 44 F.Supp. at 625-26.
Doctors rarely used one-half grain tablets for legitimate medical purposes, but one-half
grain tablets were the preferred dosage of addicts. Id. Addicts paid as much as $25 per
100 one-half grain tablets, for which Direct Sales Co. charged less than two dollars.
Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 707-08.
89. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 704; see, Harrison Narcotic Act, Publ. L. No. 63-223, ch.
1, 38 Stat. 785, (1914) (later codified at 26 U.S.C. 691-708 (1928)), repealed by Com-
prehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat,
1236 (1970) (requiring physicians to distribute drugs only in stamped package, dis-
tribute designated drugs only for legitimate medical purposes, sell drugs only on form
provided by Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and distribute drugs only in pursuance
of written prescription).
90. Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 706-07. The business practices of Direct Sales Co. en-
couraged high-volume purchases of morphine. Id. Despite government warnings, Di-
rect Sales Co. did not significantly change its sales techniques. Id.
91. Id. at 704-05.
92. Id. at 710-11.
93. Id. at 713.
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crime and agreed to the criminal conspiracy. 94
Instead of basing accomplice liability or conspiratorial
membership on an objective measure of the defendants' contri-
bution to the conspiracy, the Supreme Court in Falcone turned to
the inferred intent of the defendants, a subjective standard.95
An objective standard would weigh the importance of the partic-
ular shipments of yeast and sugar to the distilling operation in
Falcone.96 Such a standard would be particularly difficult on le-
gitimate businesses, because the ingredients were freely available
in commerce and because imposing liability would compel
merchants to evaluate the legal implications of their ordinary
sales.97 A subjective standard, on the other hand, bases liability
on the extent to which the defendant has identified with the
criminal activity, and treated the activity as his or her own.98
c. Procedural Advantages of a Conspiracy Charge
By alleging a conspiracy, the prosecution can hold the con-
spiracy trial anywhere any overt act 99 in furtherance of the con-
spiracy took place'00 and can try the conspirators jointly at one
trial.1"' Alleging a conspiracy allows the prosecution to intro-
duce co-conspirator statements that otherwise would be ex-
cluded as hearsay." 2 Finally, courts give prosecutors wide lati-
tude in presenting circumstantial evidence of the conspiracy be-
94. Id.
95. See FLETCHER, supra note 67, at 674-77 (discussing subjective standard for com-
plicity and conspiracy, German jurisprudence, and Falcone).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (1938) (requiring that accomplice
.associate himself in some way with the venture, that he participate in it as something
he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed."); United States
v. Kasvin, 757 F.2d 887, 892 (7th Cir. 1985) (holding that defendant was not member of
marijuana distribution conspiracy, but was guilty as aider and abettor because by being
conspiracy's largest regular customer he had interest in its financial success).
99. See LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 9, at 476-78 (describing overt act as act done by
any conspirator showing that the conspiracy is still at work). At common law, a conspir-
acy was complete at the time of the agreement, and no overt act was required. Id.
100. See Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347 (1912) (holding that, in illegal scheme
based in California to obtain government lands in California, conspirators' overt acts at
General Land Office in Washington, D.C. made venue proper for conspiracy trial in
District of Columbia).
101. LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at 458-59.
102. Id. As long as prosecutors show a conspiracy in fact, co-conspirator state-
ments are admissible, regardless of whether the indictment includes a specific conspir-
acy count. JOHN WILLIAM STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 259 (4th ed. 1992).
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cause police would be unlikely to have actual proof, such as a
recording of an explicit conspiratorial agreement.
10 3
d. Conspiracy and Guilt by Association
Prosecutors alleging a conspiracy gain numerous proce-
dural advantages that handicap the defense. 10 4 Based on an
agreement for which there is little direct evidence,1 0 5 a conspir-
acy trial subjects a defendant to joint trial with his or her co-
conspirators.?° Therefore, the defendant may have never vis-
ited the state in which the trial is held, may never have met the
people with whom he or she is tried and whose hearsay state-
ments are used at trial, and may be convicted of substantive of-
fenses in which he or she did not participate.10 7 In large con-
spiracy prosecutions, the volume of evidence introduced and the
evidentiary leeway given to the Government create the possibility
of significant prejudice to defendants.108
e. Rationales for Conspiracy
Underlying conspiracy laws, there are two primary ratio-
nales. '09 First, conspiracy laws allow the Government to inter-
vene at an early stage in the preparation of criminal activity. 1
Secondly, conspiracy laws allow prosecutors to attack an entire
criminal group and to carry out ajoint prosecution of the mem-
103. See Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947) (discussing reason
for latitude in proving conspiratorial agreement). The procedural advantages of con-
spiracy charges, and the vagueness of the conspiracy doctrine have been the basis of
general criticism of the use of conspiracy. Krulewitch, v. United States, 336 U.S. 440,
445 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring); LAFAVE & Sco-r, supra note 9, at 455-59.
104. Johnson, supra note 44, at 1139-40.
105. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing use of circumstantial
evidence to prove conspiratorial agreement).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, at 96-102 (discussing rationales for
conspiracy); LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 9, at 459-60 (discussing inchoate and group
rationales); see generally, Dennis, supra note 12, at 44-63 (discussing rationales for con-
spiracy laws).
110. LAFAvE & Sconr, supra note 9, at 459. Conspiracy is complete at the time of
the agreement. Id. In jurisdictions that require an overt act, a conspiracy is complete
when a conspirator commits the first overt act in pursuance of the conspiracy. Id. at
476-78. Conviction for attempt requires the defendant commit an act that goes beyond
mere preparation of a crime. Id.
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bers. 111
Like solicitation 1 2 and attempt,11 3 conspiracy is an inchoate
crime."4 At common law, the crime of conspiracy is complete as
soon as the agreement is formed, 15 even if the conspirators are
far from likely to succeed in the target crime. 1 6 The law treats
the agreement as an initial step towards the commission of a
crime. 1 17 The agreement is evidence that the conspirators were
committed to carrying out the crime, and presented sufficient
danger to justify immediate intervention. 18
In addition to its inchoate aspect, 9 conspiracy law also at-
tacks the formation of criminal groups. 120  The conspiratorial
agreement that binds the conspirators may compel them to com-
mit crimes which, without pressure from co-conspirators, they
might have abandoned.1 2 1 The formation of criminal groups
presents the potential for continuous criminal activity122 and the
commission of complex crimes that a single person could not
have committed.1 23 Furthermore, a criminal group can engage
in division of labor and more efficiently allocate resources to in-
111. Dennis, supra note 12, at 48-53.
112. LAFAvE & ScoTr, supra note 9, at 459. Solicitation requires that a person,
with the intent that another commit a crime, entice, advise, incite, order, or otherwise
encourage the other to commit a crime. Id. at 414. The target crime, however, does
not have to be committed. Id.
113. Id. at 459. The crime of attempt consists of acting in a way that goes beyond
preparation to commit a crime, while intending to commit a crime. Id. at 423.
114. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONYtv 761 (6th ed. 1990) (defining inchoate crime as
"an incipient crime which generally leads to another crime").
115. State v. Loser, 182 Iowa 419, 422, 104 N.W. 337, 338 (1905).
116. Hyde v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 387 (1911).
117. LAFAvE & SCOTT, supra note 9, at 459-60.
118. Id.
119. See supra note 114 (defining inchoate crime).
120. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 32, at 96-102; LAFAvE & ScoTT, supra note 9,
at 459-60.
121. Developments, supra note 40, at 924.
122. Id. at 924-25.
123. Id. at 923-25. "[C]ollective action toward an antisocial end involves a greater
risk to society than individual action towards the same end." Id. at 923-24; Note, The
Conspirazy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime or Protection of Individual Defendants, 62
HAtv. L. REv. 276, 283-4 (1948) [hereinafter Conspiracy Dilemma]. Some commentators
have questioned the inherent dangerousness of criminal groups on the grounds that
large groups are more likely to have informers, and conspirators are as likely to dis-
hearten each other as they are to give encouragement. Abraham S. Goldstein, Conspir-
acy to Defraud the United States, 68 YALE L.J. 405, 413-14 (1959); Dennis, supra note 12, at
49.
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crease the efficiency of the group's criminal activity.12 4
Finally, conspiracies are partnerships in crime.1 25  The
members bind themselves to become criminals, creating an illicit
substitute for the socially productive obligations shared by other
members of a society.'2 6 A criminal group with its own obliga-
tions set in opposition to the rest of society is inherently subver-
sive, regardless of the conspiracy's target offense.12 7
2. Statutes & Criminal Groups
RICO is the product of congressional concern with enter-
prise criminality and the spread of organized crime.'2 8 A person
violates RICO by committing certain enumerated crimes either
to an enterprise, by means of an enterprise, or as a member of
an enterprise.12 9 The structure of the RICO statute allows en-
hanced sanctions for enterprise criminals who use organizations
for racketeering activity."' 0
a. RICO & Its Supreme Court Interpretations
By 1969, successive congressional investigations had re-
vealed the resilience, size, and diverse business interests of or-
ganized crime.' The investigations concluded that piecemeal
124. Developments, supra note 40, at 924.
125. Pinkerton, 328 U.S. at 644; Kissel, 208 U.S. at 608; United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 254-55 (1940).
126. Dennis, supra note 12, at 52. Upon becoming a member of the Mafia, one's
primary allegiance shifts to the criminal organization. Lynch, supra note 5, at 959-60.
Conspiracy prosecutions may satisfy public apprehension about the existence of crimi-
nal partnerships in society. Dennis, supra note 12, at 50-51.
127. Dennis, supra note 12, at 50-51. Commentators have noted that the political
rhetoric of the Cold War described Communist groups and the Mafia in similar terms.
Lynch supra note 4, at 668 n.35.
128. Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1013-14.
129. See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 674-77 (describing relation of enterprise to perpe-
trator).
130. Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 774-75.
131. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. RaP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1951)
(listing fifty areas of organized crime infiltration); 116 CONG. REc. 585, 591 (1970)
(statement of Sen. McClellan) (discussing need for organizational attack because indi-
vidual convictions were inadequate); 115 CONG. REc. 9567 (1969) (statement of Senator
McClellan). According to Senator McClellan, "constant references have been made to
the frustration resulting when the only consequence of a conviction is that organized
crime and its infiltrated organizations are run by a new leader, and the organizations
which are the real threat are not affected." Id. The Senate, in passing the OCCA,
observed, "organized crime continues to grow... because of the sanctions and reme-
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convictions had not destroyed the structure of large criminal or-
ganizations.13 2 In complex criminal enterprises, where disparate
people performed seemingly unconnected acts, there was often
no single conspiratorial agreement to bind members of the
group.13 3 RICO enabled prosecutors to try all the central mem-
bers of a criminal organization and the peripheral associates of
the group at one trial, exposing the full scope of the organiza-
tion to the jury.13 4
i. Legislative History of RICO
The ideas incorporated in RICO emerged from the analyses
and recommendations of a series of congressional investigations
into organized crime.135 Criminal organizations had invested
racketeering profits into legitimate businesses,1 3 6 and Congress
dies available to the Government are unnecessarily limited in scope and impact." 116
CONG. REc. 276 (1970).
132. COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967), reprinted in PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME
7-10 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
133. Griffin, 660 F.2d at 999-1000; Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902; Lynch, supra note 5, at
949-54.
134. Lynch, supra note 5, at 921-24; see Castellano, 610 F. Supp at 1396-97 (discuss-
ing how RICO broadens requirements for joint criminal activity and limits force of Rule
8(b) of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure regarding joinder of parties.); O'Neill,
supra note 7, 680-95 (discussing partyjoinder with RICO). At the same time it enacted
RICO, Congress created the Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute ("CCE"). 21
U.S.C. § 848 (1995). CCE is part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control Act of 1970. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970), Known as the drug
kingpin statute, CCE punishes managers and leaders of drug gangs with lengthy
mandatory prison sentences. 21 U.S.C. § 848; see Kenneth G. Schuler, Note, Continuing
Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy, and the Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91 MICH. L. REV.
2220, 2242-57 (1993) (arguing conviction for conspiracy and CCE violates double jeop-
ardy clause of Fifth Amendment). Like RICO, the CCE statute focused on the struc-
tured criminal organization. United States v. Rogers, 89 F.3d 1326, 1335-36 (1996).
Unlike RICO, CCE applies only to the chiefs of drug rings, and not to all the partici-
pants. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 781 (1985). CCE defendants must super-
vise at least five other people in the drug ring, and are subject to enhanced penalties.
21 U.S.C. §§ 848.
135. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1014-21 (discussing antecedents of
RICO); G. Robert Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context: Reflections on Bennett
v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 237, 249-81 (1982) (describing legislative history of
RICO in detail); Lynch, supra note 4, at 664-80 (viewing legislative history of RICO as
overbroad attack on Mafia).
136. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE
COMMERCE, THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 171 (1951)
(listing fifty areas of organized crime infiltration).
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viewed with concern the corruption that accompanied criminal
infiltration of a growing number of areas of the national econ-
omy. 137 When RICO was before Congress, investigations and
scholarly reports indicated that the complexity and business in-
terests of organized crime resisted simple classification.1 38 Often
racketeering crimes overlapped with conventional white-collar
crime, such as mail fraud and securities fraud. 139 Furthermore,
the growing sophistication of organized crime required the par-
ticipation of specialists outside the core group of criminals.14
In 1951, the Special Committee to Investigate Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce' ("Kefauver Committee"),
chaired by Senator Kefauver, investigated the infiltration of legit-
imate businesses by the Mafia. 4 The Kefauver Committee re-
ports described organized crime as "mobs," "rackets," or "syndi-
cates" that had survived from prohibition and had diversified
into bookmaking, loan sharking, prostitution, and narcotics. 4 '
The wealthy gangs had gained respectability and sufficient polit-
ical protection to impede prosecution of their leaders. 144 The
Kefauver Committee, described the gangs as forming an under-
world national government held together by the Mafia.' 45 By in-
137. Id. at 5; 115 CONG. REc. 5874-75 (remarks of Senator McClellan) (1969).
138. 116 CONG. REc. 35,204 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Richard Poff); TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 132, at 4-5; SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME
IN INTERSTATE COMMERCE, THIRD INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 307, 82d Cong., 1st Sess.
170-71 (1951).
139. 116 CONG. REC. 18,940 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 132, at 4-5.
140. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 4, 10.
141. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE, FINAL REPORT, S. REP. No. 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
142. SENATE SPECIAL COMM. TO INVESTIGATE ORGANIZED CRIME IN INTERSTATE COM-
MERCE, SECOND INTERIM REPORT, S. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951). Racke-
teers were using illicit profits to buy legitimate businesses. Id.
143. See S. REP. No. 307, supra note 138, at 1-2 (describing development of organ-
ized criminal gangs).
144. Id. at 2. The committee attributed the immunity of "leading hoodlums" to
the "fix:"
The fix is not always the direct payment of money to law-enforcement officials
.... The fix may also come about through the acquisition of political power by
contributions to political organizations or otherwise, by creating economic ties
with apparently respectable and reputable businessmen and lawyers, and by
buying public good will through charitable contributions and press relations.
Id.
145. Id.; S. REP. No. 141, supra note 142, at 4.
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timidating its associates, 46 the Mafia maintained control over or-
ganized crime in the United States. 147 The Mafia code of si-
lence 4 ' hindered investigators from discovering the internal
structure of the Mafia, and, as a result, Government reports fo-
cused on the effects of organized crime rather than on the inter-
nal structure of the criminal organizations.149
In 1965, the investigations of Senator John McClellan publi-
cized the internal structure of the Mafia.'5 ' Senator McClellan
had headed a series of committees that had investigated the role
of organized crime in labor unions, gambling, and narcotics dis-
tribution.I5 In 1965, the testimony of Joseph Valachi, a former
member of the Mafia, provided vivid descriptions of Mafia prac-
tices 5 2 and explained, for the first time, the hierarchical struc-
ture of a Mafia family. 155  The McClellan Committee, before
which Valachi testified, noted that the structure described by
Valachi allowed mob leaders to insulate themselves from the
crimes committed by subordinates on behalf of the organiza-
tion.154 Intermediaries in an organizational hierarchy protected
the leaders from direct conspiratorial agreements with those
who committed the substantive crimes.1 55
In 1965, PresidentJohnson created the President's Commis-
146. S. REP. No. 307, supra note 138, at 1.
147. Id. at 2.
148. DONALD R. CRESSEY, THE FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL SYNDICATES,
in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 26, 41-50, 55. Under the code of silence, a
Mafia member would refuse to discuss his criminal associates when questioned by the
police. Id at 55.
149. PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 72, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1965). Joseph Valachi was the first Mafia member to provide public
testimony about the structure and operations of the Mafia. Id. at 1.
150. V.S. NAVASKY, KENNEDYJUSTICE 31-32 (1971).
151. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON IMPROPER ACTIVITIES IN THE LABOR OR MANAGE-
MENT FIELD, S. REP. No. 1417, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958), S. REP. No. 621, 86th Cong.,
Ist Sess. (1959), S. REP. No. 1139, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960); PERMANENT SUBCOMM.
ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OPERATIONS, GAMBLING AND ORGAN.
IZED CRIME, S. REP. No. 1310, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962); Hearings Before the Permanent
Subcomm. on Investigations of the Senate Comm. on Gov't Operations, 88th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1963); PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOV'T OP-
ERATIONS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS, S. REP. No. 72, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1014-15.
152. S. REP. No. 72, supra note 149, at 12.
153. Id. at 5-18.
154. Id. at 7-8.
155. 116 CONG. REP. 586 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
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sion on Law Enforcement and Administration ofJustice1 56 ("Kat-
zenbach Commission"), headed by Attorney General Nicholas
deB. Katzenbach. The Katzenbach Commission summarized
many of the observations of the Kefauver Committee and the
McClellan Committee. t57 The Katzenbach Commission called
for the implementation of laws that focused on the structural
element which was the distinctive feature of organized crime.158
The Katzenbach Commission's report described the com-
plex structure of organized crime and its relationship to legiti-
mate businesses. 15 9 The Katzenbach Commission Report also
presented a detailed description of the Mafia hierarchy. 6 The
Katzenbach Commission noted that as the criminal organiza-
tions became more sophisticated, they required the help of peo-
ple with business and financial expertise.161 These new experts,
the Katzenbach Commission predicted, would force a restructur-
ing of traditional organized crime, as their expertise became
more important to criminal organizations than the traditional
types of racketeering that had formerly been the object of organ-
ized crime. 6 2
Appended to the findings of the Katzenbach Commission
156. Exec. Order No. 11,236 (July 23, 1965).
157. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 1-3, 11-12.
158. Id. The Task Force Report concluded that the strength and power of the
mob derived from its organizational structure. Id. at 7.
159. Id. at 1-10.
160. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 7-10. The boss had an adviser, a "con-
sigliere," and below them were an underboss, lieutenants, and soldiers. Id. Outside the
formal hierarchy were various associates who worked for the organization. Id. at 4, 10.
In 1931, Salvatore Maranzano created the formal structure of the New York Mafia fami-
lies. S. REP. No. 72, supra note 149, at 12-13. Maranzano claimed he organized the
Mafia based on the structure ofJulius Caesar's armies. 116 CONG. REc. 598 (statement
of Sen. McClellan) (providing text of TIME article of August 22, 1969, describing organ-
ized crime in United States); GAY TALESE, HONOR THY FATHER 206-07 (1971). In the
Roman Army, Julius Caesar supplemented his organized Roman Troops with auxiliary
forces, auxiliares. E.g., III EIGHT BOOKS OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR 25 (William Rainey
Harper & Herbert Cushing Tolman eds., 1981). The auxiliares were not organized as
the Roman troops and were not formally integrated into the Roman Army. MICHAEL
GRANT, THE ARMY OF THE CAESARS 56-57 (1974). Later, with the rise of the professional
army, the distinction disappeared between the native Roman Legions and the auxiliares
on the periphery of the Legions. G.L. CHEESMAN, THE AUXILIA OF THE ROMAN IMPERIAL
ARMY 20 (Ares Publishers 1975) (1914).
161. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 4-10.
162. DONALD R. CRESSEY, THE FUNCTIONS AND STRUCTURE OF CRIMINAL SYNDICATES,
in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 26, 51. Narcotics trafficking, loansharking
and gambling were activities of traditional organized crime. Id.
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was Donald R. Cressey's 163 analysis of the structure of organized
crime.' 64 Cressey described organized crime through an intri-
cate examination of the Mafia's structure.1 65 Cressey noted that
it was not illegal for a group to organize a division of labor to
commit crimes, as long as the group did not violate conspiracy
laws by planning specific crimes. 166
Cressey called for further study to understand organized
crime so that the Government could attack it at the organiza-
tional level.' 67 Overall, the Katzenbach Commission's recom-
mendations did not call for new substantive laws to attack crimi-
nal organizations.1 68 The recommendations concentrated in-
stead on the need for new investigative tools for law
enforcement and for enforcement of existing laws.' 6 9
In 1965, Senator McClellan introduced a bill criminalizing
membership in the Mafia.17 The bill, however, did not make it
163. Id. at 25. Cressey was a Professor of Sociology at the University of California
at Santa Barbara. Id.
164. Id. at 25-60.
165. Id. at 31-56.
166. Id. Cressey noted the insulation that protected organized crime bosses:
Except when conspiracy statutes are violated, it is not against the criminal law
for an individual or group of individuals to rationally plan, establish, develop,
and administer a division of labor for the perpetration of crime .... This is
more than a "problem of definition." It is a fact of life which permits directors
of criminal business organizations to remain immune from arrest, prosecu-
tion, and imprisonment unless they themselves violate specific criminal laws
such as those prohibiting the sale of narcotics. It is the problem of organized
crime.
Id. at 57.
167. Id. at 60.
168. Id. at 16-24; see Lynch, supra note 4, at 667 n.25 (listing Katzenbach Commis-
sion recommendations adopted into congressional legislation).
169. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 16-24.
170. S. 2187, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1965), 111 CONG. REc. 14, 680 (1965).
Senator McClellan proposed:
Whoever... knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a member of (1) the
Mafia, or (2) any other organization having for one of its purposes the use of
any interstate commerce facility in the commission of acts which are in viola-
tion of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, relating to gam-
bling, extortion, blackmail, narcotics, prostitution, or labor-racketeering, with
knowledge of the purpose of such organization, shall be guilty of a felony ....
Hearings on S. 2187 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm.
on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d. Sess. 29 (1966). The Attorney General, Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach testified that a law proscribing membership would present too many consti-
tutional problems. Id. at 28, 32. He stated:
S.2187 raises a number of constitutional questions of such substance that, at
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past the committee level. 171 In 1969, Senator Roman Hruska in-
troduced the Criminal Activities Profits Act 172 directed at money
laundering. 73  That same year, Senator McClellan also intro-
duced a bill that included many of the Katzenbach Commis-
sion's recommendations for fighting organized crime. 1 7 1 Fi-
nally, the Senators jointly introduced a bill' 75 which, with minor
amendments, became RICO, Title IX of the OCCA.17 6
In Congress, opponents of RICO criticized it for being over-
broad 17 7 and having applications beyond traditional organized
crime.' 78  Senator McClellan responded that addressing the
problem required a comprehensive solution and not piecemeal
legislation. 179 The result of the amendments was an expansive
approach to enterprise criminality.'
the very least, its effectiveness is very likely to be impaired by prolonged litiga-
tion.
These questions relate primarily to the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and the scope of the privilege against self-incrimination. Con-
ceivably, first amendment problems might also be raised, since that amend-
ment relates to freedom of association in nonpolitical as well as political orga-
nizations.
Id.
171. See Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 783 (discussing problems with S.2187).
Crimes that punish mere membership in organizations may violate the First Amend-
ment. Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 222-30 (1961). Prosecutions under a stat-
ute penalizing membership in a criminal association must prove the member was aware
of the criminal activity and intended to further the criminal activity. Healy v. James,
408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972).
172. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969). Senator Roman Hruska had introduced
a succession of bills addressing the problem of organized crime. E.g., S. 2048, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967); S. 2049, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
173. S. 1623, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
174. S. 30, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REc. 769 (1969).
175. S. 1861, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
176. Blakey, supra note 135, at 249-80; Lynch, supra note 4, at 676-77.
177. 116 CONG. REc. 35,213. The American Civil Liberties Union objected to the
"overly broad and ambiguous provisions." Id. Earlier, Attorney General Robert Ken-
nedy had expressed his impatience with demands for a precise definition of organized
crime by exclaiming, "don't define it, do something about it." NAVASKY, supra, note
150, at 52.
178. 116 CONG. REC. 35,213 (1970); Organized Crime Control, Hearings on S. 30
and Related Proposals Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong.,
2d Sess. 538, 543-44 (1970).
179. 116 CONG. REC. 18,913-14 (1970) (remarks of Senator McClellan).
180. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 590 (1981). The resulting statute
"authorized the imposition of enhanced criminal penalties and new civil sanctions to
provide new legal remedies for all types of organized criminal behavior, that is, enter-
prise criminality - from simple political corruption to sophisticated white-collar schemes
to traditional Mafia-type endeavors." Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1013-14; see G.
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ii. The RICO Statute
Congress incorporated RICO into the OCCA as a measure
to protect businesses from the depredations of racketeers."'
RICO attacks not only infiltrating racketeers but also organiza-
tions that are instruments for carrying out racketeering
schemes." 2 RICO provides the legal and conceptual framework
to link disparate individuals and events into a coherent picture
of a diversified criminal operation.8 3
The congressional investigations into organized crime, and
the legislative history of RICO reveal the Government's concern
not only with the members of criminal organizations who are
formally initiated into the Mafia, but also with those who are on
the periphery of the organization and aid its infiltration of legiti-
mate businesses and its corruption of business and govern-
ment. 1 4 To prosecute a criminal organization as a conspiracy,
the Government must prove that an agreement linked the de-
fendants. 85 By creating layers of intermediaries, the head of a
criminal organization insulates himself from any direct agree-
ments with the people who actually are carrying out the
crimes. 186 Without proof of an agreement, the heads of criminal
Robert Blakey & Thomas A. Perry, An Analysis of Myths that Bolster Efforts to Rewrite RICO
and the Various Proposals for Reform: "Mother of God - Is This the End of RICO?" 43 VAND. L.
REv. 851, 860-68 (1990) (discussing persistent misconceptions about RICO). Although
the initial congressional debates focussed on the Mafia, "Senator McClellan had always
viewed 'organized crime' in terms broader than the Mafia alone. He therefore re-
frained from drafting RICO in such limited terms." Goldsmith, supra note 5, at 787.
181. See, 115 CONC. REC. 9567 (1969) (remarks of Senator McClellan) (calling for
direct attack on organized criminals to protect legitimate businesses); S. REP. No. 91-
617, 79 (1969) (calling for attack on economic base of organized crime).
182. 116 CONG. REC. 591, 18,939 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan).
183. See Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902-03 (describing RICO's application to sprawling
criminal networks); Michael Goldsmith, Judicial Immunity for White Collar Crime: The
Ironic Demise of Civil RICO, 30 HARv. J. ON LECIS. 1, 27 (1993) (describing Congress'
intent to use RICO to attack many complex criminal problems).
184. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 4, 8, 51; Blakey, supra note 135, at 341
& 341-42 n.223.
185. LAFAVE & Scorr supra note 9, at 470.
186. 115 CONG. REC. 5872 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan). In United States v.
Aviles, the Government convicted Vito Genovese, head of the Genovese crime family, of
conspiracy to import and distribute narcotics although Genovese never handled narcot-
ics or received money directly. 274 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1960). The jury inferred from
Genovese's statements and his meetings with co-conspirators that he had an interest in
the success of the narcotics conspiracy. Id.
C.J. Hawkins, the central defendant in the Elliott RICO enterprise, characterized
the requirement that accomplice testimony have independent corroboration with the
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organizations are difficult to reach through conspiracy prosecu-
tions.'" 7 One of the uses of the RICO enterprise is the creation
of a substantive crime that links parties and crimes too remote to
be connected by a conspiratorial agreement. 88 Furthermore,
within the organization, the hierarchical structure provides con-
tinuity as membership changes.' 9 If a boss is removed, someone
else can take his or her position. 9 RICO, however, attacks the
structure of the organization."9 ' The RICO statute also incorpo-
rates an inchoate conspiracy offense for those who conspire to
commit substantive RICO offenses.1
92
To establish a RICO violation, prosecutors must prove the
existence of a RICO enterprise 93 and a pattern1 94 of racketeer-
ing activity.1 95 The enterprise may fulfill different roles in a
expression "one on one ain't worth a shit." Elliott, 571 F.2d at 895. Hawkins's statement
was an accurate interpretation of state law in Georgia. See, Harrison v. State, 384 S.E.2d
643, 645 (Ga. 1989) (holding that independent corroborating evidence must support
accomplice testimony to sustain felony conviction). Hawkins's interpretation did not,
however, account for recent Congressional statutes such as RICO that have federalized
broad areas of state law. See Lynch, supra note 4, at 713-717 (criticizing RICO for usurp-
ing state penal law); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of Crime, 22 Am.
CRIM. L. REv. 213, 230-58 (describing use of commerce clause by federal government to
intrude on state police powers) (1984); Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Mischief: The Feder-
alization of American Criminal Law, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 1135, 1162-74 (1995) (describing
federal criminal law competing with state criminal law, instead of complementing it).
In federal court, where Hawkins was tried, accomplice testimony does not require cor-
roboration. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 895 n.13.
187. 115 CONG. REc. 5872 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan); TASK FORCE RE,
PORT, supra note 132, at 57.
188. Griffin, 660 F.2d at 999-1000.
189. 115 CONG. REc. 5872 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan); 116 CONG. REC.
36,296 (1969) (statement of Sen. Dole).
190. 115 CONG. REc. 5872 (1969) (statement of Sen. McClellan); 116 CONG. REC.
36,296 (1969) (statement of Sen. Dole).
191. See supra note 5 and accompanying text (describing RICO as attack on struc-
ture of criminal organizations).
192. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
193. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). A RICO enterprise is "any individual, partnership, cor-
poration, association, or other legal entity and any union or group of individuals associ-
ated in fact although not a legal entity." Id. The enterprise must engage in, or its activi-
ties affect, interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (5). A pattern of racketeering is defined as "at least two acts
of racketeering activity... the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any
period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering activity."
Id. There must also be continuity and relationship between the acts in the pattern. HJ.
Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243 (1989).
195. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). Racketeering activity is defined as:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled sub-
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RICO prosecution.1 96 The enterprise may be the object that the
racketeers seek to control through racketeering or through the
wealth amassed by racketeering. 197 The enterprise may be the
victim, plundered by racketeers.' 98 The enterprise may be the
instrument of racketeers who use the enterprise to victimize
others. 99 Finally, the enterprise may be the perpetrator of the
racketeering.200 The RICO statute prohibits any person from us-
ing income from a pattern of racketeering activity to acquire an
interest in an enterprise,2 1 gain an interest in an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity,2 02 conduct or partici-
pate in the conduct of the affairs of an enterprise through a pat-
tern of racketeering activity,203 or conspire to participate in any
of the substantive RICO offenses.20 4
The statute defines racketeering activity as a pattern20 5 of
specific crimes.20 6 In a RICO indictment, the predicate acts are
stance or listed chemical ... which is chargeable under State law and punish-
able by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable
under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code ....
Id.
196. O'Neill, supra note 7, at 673-78.
197. Blakey, supra note 135, at 308-23.
198. Id.
199. Id.; National Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259 (1994).
200. Blakey, supra note 135, at 308-23.
201. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
202. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b).
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
204. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). The statute requires that the "pattern of racketeering
activity" include "at least two acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after
the effective date of this chapter and the last of which occurred within ten years (ex-
cluding any period of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeer-
ing activity." Id.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). Section 1961(1) provides that "racketeering activity" is:
(A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery,
bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in a controlled sub-
stance or listed chemical (as defined in § 102 of the Controlled Substances Act
[21 USCS § 802]), which is chargeable under State law and punishable by im-
prisonment for more than one year; (B) any act which is indictable under any
of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: § 201 (relating to
bribery) ... §§ 471, 472, and 473 (relating to counterfeiting) ... § 664 (relat-
ing to embezzlement from pension and welfare funds), §§ 891-894 (relating to
extortionate credit transactions) . . . § 1341 (relating to mail fraud), § 1343
(relating to wire fraud), § 1344 (relating to financial institution fraud),
§§ 1461-1465 (relating to obscene matter), § 1503 (relating to obstruction of
justice) ... § 1512 (relating to tampering with a witness, victim, or an inform-
ant) ... § 1952 (relating to racketeering), § 1953 (relating to interstate trans-
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the underlying acts of racketeering.2°7 The predicate acts in-
clude many state law crimes, such as murder and arson, and
many white-collar crimes, such as mail fraud.2 °8 The adaptability
of organized crime required laws of sufficient breadth to attack
criminal participation in numerous areas.20 9 The breadth of
RICO also allows it to be effective in areas beyond traditional
organized crime.2 10
In addition to its criminal components, RICO contains pro-
visions for private enforcement by civil suits. 21' The substantive
provisions and the conceptual framework that courts establish
for RICO enterprises are the same for criminal prosecutions and
civil suits. 2 12 Providers of professional services such as lawyers
and accountants are particularly concerned with the civil RICO
portation of wagering paraphernalia) ... § 1956 (relating to the laundering of
monetary instruments) ... § 1958 (relating to use of interstate commerce fa-
cilities in the commission of murder-for-hire), §§ 2251, 2251A, 2252, and 2258
(relating to sexual exploitation of children) ... §§ 2314 and 2315 (relating to
interstate transportation of stolen property) ... §§ 2341-2346 (relating to traf-
ficking in contraband cigarettes), §§ 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic),
(C) an act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, § 186 (deal-
ing with restrictions on payments and loans to labor organizations) or
§ 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from union funds) . . . (D) any offense
involving fraud in the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, impor-
tation, receiving, concealment, buying, selling, or otherwise dealing in a con-
trolled substance or listed chemical (as defined in § 102 of the Controlled
Substances Act [21 USCS § 802]), punishable under any law of the United
States ....
18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1). The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 added a pro-
vision to the RICO civil remedies statute stating:
[NJo person may rely upon any conduct that would have been actionable as
fraud in the purchase or sale of securities to establish a violation of § 1962.
The exception contained in the preceding sentence does not apply to an ac-
tion against any person that is criminally convicted in connection with the
fraud, in which case the statute of limitations shall start to run on the date on
which the conviction becomes final.
18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1996).
207. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 237-38.
208. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
209. 116 CONG. REc. 18,940 (1970) (statement of Sen. McClellan).
210. Goldsmith, supra note 183, at 6-7.
211. 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 1962. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347, 1362
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub nom. Moss v. Newman, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984) (holding that preponderance of evidence standard of civil RICO does
not relate to elements of predicate crimes, but to burden plaintiff bears in showing
elements).
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provisions. 1 Activity that in the past would have given rise to a
commercial dispute may now give rise to a RICO suit with the
prospect of treble damages.21 4 As a consequence, courts have
created barriers to RICO suits through narrow interpretations of
the statute.21 5
Congress, however, intentionally worded RICO broadly, and
added a liberal construction clause to the statute.1 6 Congress
also designed the statute to apply to business crime and street
crime.21 7 The broad phrasing of the statute was a response to
the danger and growth of enterprise criminality and the adapta-
bility of organized crime.218
iii. RICO and the Supreme Court
In four cases preceding Reves,21 9 the Supreme Court inter-
preted the RICO statute.220 The Supreme Court rejected narrow
interpretations of RICO espoused by the lower courts and, with
the exception of Reves, has heeded the liberal construction
clause appended to the statute.221
The Supreme Court directly addressed the question of asso-
ciation-in-fact enterprises in United States v. Turkette.222 The
213. See Catherine M. Clarkin, Reves v. Ernst & Young: The Elimination of Profes-
sional Liability under RICO, 43 CATH U.L. REv. 1025, 1028-31 (1994) (describing effect of
civil RICO suits on outside professionals).
214. Id. at 1027-29. See Sedima 473 U.S. at 504 (Marshall,J., dissenting) (describing
federalization of civil litigation through RICO).
215. See Goldsmith, supra note 183, at 18-38 (listing judicially imposed restrictions
on civil RICO); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety ofJudicial Restriction, 95
HARv. L. REV. 1101, 1105-21 (1982) (listing judicial restrictions on civil RICO and con-
cluding only Congress should restrict reach of RICO).
216. Pub. L. No. 91-452, tit. IX, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970). The liberal
construction clause provides: "[tlhe provisions of this title ... shall be liberally con-
strued to effectuate its remedial purposes." Id.
217. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1013-14 (discussing broad applicability
of RICO to all forms of enterprise criminality).
218. See supra notes 150, 192 and accompanying text (discussing justifications for
RICO's breadth).
219. 507 U.S. 170.
220. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 576; Russello, 464 U.S. at 16; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 479; HJ.,
492 U.S. at 229. A commentator has suggested that, before Reves, the Supreme Court
heard ten cases that heavily influence RICO interpretation. J. Todd Benson, Note,
Reves v. Ernst & Young: Is RICO Corrupt?, 54 LA. L. RE,. 1685, 1686 (1994).
221. See Vitiello, supra note 18, at 1365 (describing past broad readings of RICO by
Supreme Court). In Reves, the Court found the language unambiguous and so did not
have to resort to the liberal construction clause. Reves 507 U.S. at 183-84.
222. 452 U.S. at 576.
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Court found that the RICO provision for association-in-fact en-
terprises applies to legal and illegal enterprises. 223 The respon-
dent argued that RICO was meant to protect legitimate busi-
nesses from organized crime and that RICO enterprises should,
therefore, be limited to both legitimate businesses. 24 The
Supreme Court held that Congress intended to create new tools
to fight organized crime and that restricting associations-in-fact
to legitimate businesses would limit the usefulness of RICO in
attacking purely criminal groups.2 25 The Court defined a RICO
association-in-fact as a group of people associated for a course of
continuing activity.2 2 6 Proof of an association-in-fact must show
an ongoing organization distinct from racketeering activity, and
evidence that it functions as a continuing unit.227
The Supreme Court in Russello v. United States228 found that
interests subject to forfeiture for a RICO violation include all
profits and proceeds from a racketeering activity, not just the
interest the defendant has in the RICO enterprise.229 In Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 230 the Supreme Court rejected the Second
Circuit requirement that the defendant be criminally convicted
of racketeering before a civil plaintiff can assert a RICO claim.23'
The Court also rejected the requirement that the plaintiff show a
special racketeering injury distinct from the injury caused by the
predicate acts. 232
In H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.,233 the Supreme
Court sought to define the point at which a series of predicate
acts becomes a pattern of racketeering activity.234 When custom-
223. Id. at 580-81.
224. Id. at 579-80.
225. Id. at 586-87, 593.
226. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
227. Id.
228. 464 U.S. 16 (1983).
229. Id. at 22.
230. 473 U.S. 479 (1985).
231. Id. at 493.
232. Id. at 495.
233. 492 U.S. at 229.
234. Id. The RICO statute defines the pattern requirement as "at least two acts of
racketeering activity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Commentators have remarked on the role
of the pattern requirement. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 3, at 1029-31 (describing
basic elements of pattern); David W. Gartenstein & Joseph F. Warganz, Note, RICO's
"Pattern"Requirement: Void for Vagueness?, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 517-27 (1990) (discuss-
ing constitutionality of broad pattern requirement); Joseph E. Bauerschmidt, Note,
"Mother of Mercy - Is This The End of Rico?" -Justice Scalia Invites Constitutional Void-for-
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ers of a telephone company brought a civil RICO suit alleging
that the company bribed members of the public utilities commis-
sion that set phone rates, the phone company customers claimed
that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit required a
restrictive reading of the pattern requirement.23 5 Under the
Eighth Circuit test,236 a claim of racketeering activity required
proof of multiple criminal schemes, not simply one criminal
plan requiring a number of predicate acts.237
In H.J. Inc., the Supreme Court found the Eighth Circuit's
rule too restrictive. 3 8 Noting that the RICO statute did not de-
fine a RICO pattern, the Court looked to the plain meaning of
the word pattern 3 9 and to the legislative history of RICO.24 °
The Court ruled that to constitute a pattern there must be con-
tinuity and relationship between the predicate acts. 241 A prose-
cutor must prove that a relationship exists between racketeering
Vagueness Challenge to RICO "Pattern", 65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1106, 1124-25 (1990) (ap-
plying void-for-vagueness analysis to RICO pattern requirement); Michael Goldsmith,
RICO and "Pattern:" The Search for "Continuity Plus Relationship, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 971,
971-72 (1988) (describing critical importance of pattern requirement to RICO viola-
tion); Barry Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L.
REv. 165, 209-19 (1980) (analyzing different approaches to pattern requirement).
235. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 234-35.
236. Superior Oil Co. v. Fulmer, 785 F.2d 252 (8th Cir. 1986).
237. Id. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals found that to constitute a RICO
enterprise, defendants would have to commit the two-predicate-act minimum in at least
two separate schemes. Id. at 257.
238. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 236-37. The Supreme Court stated that it was unwilling
to limit the RICO pattern requirement by imposing a rigid definition of a pattern. Id.
The Court stated:
In our view, Congress had a more natural and commonsense approach to
RICO's pattern element in mind, intending a more stringent requirement
than proof simply of two predicates, but also envisioning a concept of suffi-
cient breadth that it might encompass multiple predicates within a single
scheme that were related and that amounted to, or threatened the likelihood
of, continued criminal activity.
Id.
239. Id. at 238. The Court stated, "[i]n normal usage, the word 'pattern' here
would be taken to require more than just a multiplicity of racketeering predicates." Id.
240. Id. at 238-39.
241. Id. at 239. The Supreme Court found, "criminal conduct forms a pattern if it
embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants,
victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing char-
acteristics and are not isolated events." Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). Critics have
pointed out the vagueness of this standard. Id. at 251-56 (Scalia, J. concurring);Jed S.
Rakoff, The Unconstitutionality of RICO, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1990, at 3, col.2; see Gartenstein
& Warganz, supra note 234, at 526 (suggesting that Congress, not the courts, should
narrow pattern requirement).
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acts by establishing that the acts are similar to each other.242 Ac-
cording to H.J. Inc., prosecutors must prove continuity by show-
ing repeated conduct within a discrete period of time or the
threat that the conduct will continue.243 In a concurring opin-
ion, Justice Scalia observed that the continuity and relationship
test is not clear enough for a statute with criminal applica-
tions,244 and the entire statute may be void for vagueness. 24 5
Although the RICO statute contains provisions for RICO as-
sociation-in-fact enterprises and RICO conspiracy, the two are
conceptually distinct.2 46 Traditional conspiracy law limits RICO
conspiracies to agreements to violate the substantive RICO provi-
sions. 47 As in the Kotteakos conspiracy,248 the RICO conspiracy
requires an agreement linking individual members. 249 There is,
however, no such limitation on the RICO enterprise. 250 RICO
association-in-fact enterprises extend beyond a single agreement
or common objective 25 1 to embrace the diverse crimes of a crimi-
nal enterprise.252 Under Turkette, the RICO enterprise must be
distinct from the pattern of racketeering,25 3 and the members of
the enterprise must form a unit for a continuing course of con-
duct.2 54
Under § 1962(c), a defendant may be an employee of an
enterprise, or merely an outsider associated with the enter-
prise. 55 As an employee or close associate, the individual is an
242. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3575(e)). The Court found,
"criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise
are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Id.
243. Id. at 241-42.
244. Id. at 255 (Scalia, J., concurring).
245. Id. at 255-56.
246. See Lynch, supra note 5, at 952-53 (distinguishing participation in RICO asso-
ciation-in-fact enterprise from conspiracy to participate in a RICO enterprise).
247. Id.; United States v. Sutherland, 656 F.2d 1181, 1189-94 (5th Cir. 1981).
248. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
249. Id.
250. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 900; see Lynch, supra note 5, at 945-55 (commenting unfa-
vorably upon breadth of RICO enterprise).
251. Elliott, 571 F.2d at 902.
252. Id. at 901-02; Griffin, 660 F.2d at 999-1000.
253. Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583.
254. Id.
255. See Reves, 507 U.S. at 184-85 (distinguishing insider employees from outsiders
who have no official position in enterprise).
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insider of the enterprise, such as a Mafia foot soldier.256 As an
outsider, the person is associated with an enterprise in which he
does not have a formal position,257 such as an accountant audit-
ing a corrupt business. To satisfy the requirement that a person
be associated with an enterprise, there must be a person-enter-
prise nexus connecting the racketeer to the organization.25
Under § 1962(c), there must also be a nexus between the pat-
tern of racketeering activity and the enterprise, as the person
must participate in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs, and
the participation must be through racketeering activity. 25 9 Reves
limits this racketeering-enterprise nexus to people who operate
or manage the enterprise.260
Section 1962(c) states that it applies to a person associated
with an enterprise.26 In certain circumstances, this precludes
businesses from being held liable under RICO. 62 A majority of
circuits follow the person-enterprise rule, which prevents the
same individual or entity from being both the person and enter-
prise under § 1962 (c).263 RICO liability runs to the person, and
under the person-enterprise rule, the two must be distinct.26
Circuits that follow the person-enterprise rule do not allow a per-
son or entity to be employed or associate with itself.265 The rule
requires that individuals, rather than corporations, be held lia-
ble for racketeering, unless a corporation associates with an-
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Tarlow, supra note 234, at 228-34; see, United States v. Yonan, 623 F. Supp. 881
(N.D. Ill. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 800 F.2d 164 (7th Cir. 1986), cert denied,
479 U.S. 1055 (1987) (discussing association requirement).
259. 18 U.S.C. § 1965(c). See Melissa Harrison, Nexus: The Next Test of RICO's Text,
70 DENy. U.L. REv. 69, 69-70 & n.7 (1992) (discussing § 1962(c) nexus requirement
and distinguishing nexus with organized crime, nexus of racketeering with interstate
commerce, nexus of person to enterprise, and nexus of racketeering to enterprise);
RICO Nexus Requirement, supra note 10, at 573-75 (describing racketeering-enterprise
nexus).
260. Reves, 507 U.S. at 183.
261. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The statute requires that the person that commits the
racketeering acts be "employed by or associate with" the enterprise. Id.
262. See Goldsmith, supra note 183, at 24-37 (discussing person-enterprise doc-
trine).
263. Id. The Eleventh Circuit allows the person and the enterprise to be identical.
United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 988 (1lth Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170
(1983).
264. Goldsmith, supra 183, at 24-37.
265. E.g. Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F.2d 384, 400 (7th
Cir. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 606 (1985).
1996]
294 FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 20:263
other enterprise. 6 The rule often serves to immunize corpora-
tions from RICO suits under § 1962(c).267
Since H.J. Inc., the courts of appeal have diverged in their
interpretations of the pattern requirement.2 68  Some circuits
have concentrated on the continuity prong, and looked to the
number of acts committed within a particular span of time 269 or
to the threat of continued criminal activity.2 70 Although courts
no longer require proof of multiple schemes, 271 some have re-
quired separate patterns for each victim. 2 72 Other circuits apply
a multi-factor test to determine if there is a pattern. 273
Courts must determine the appropriate mens rea for a RICO
violation, because Congress did not include a mens rea term in
the RICO statute. 74 Many of the underlying offenses, such as
266. See Goldsmith, supra note 183, at 24-28 (discussing history of person-enter-
prise doctrine).
267. See id. at 27-28 (describing person-enterprise rule immunizing white-collar de-
fendants sued under RICO).
268. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 929,
934-39 (1996) (describing varying tests for pattern).
269. See, e.g., GICC Capital Corp. v. Technology Fin. Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 463, 469
(2d Cir. 1995), cert denied, 116 S. Ct. 2547 (1996) (holding that racketeering activity
must occur over at least one year or present threat of future criminal activity); Aldridge
v. Lily-Tulip, Inc. Salary Retirement Plan Benefits Comm., 953 F.2d 587, 593 (1lth Cir.
1992) (holding six-month to one-year period insufficient to create pattern).
270. Sun Say. & Loan, 825 F.2d at 194.
271. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 241. The Court stated that a requirement that the de-
fendants engage in multiple schemes or prey upon multiple victims "appears nowhere
in the language of or legislative history of the Act." Id.
272. Vemco, Inc. v. Camardella, 23 F.3d 129, 135 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
579 (1994); United Textiles, Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 911 F.2d 1261, 1266-68 (7th
Cir. 1990).
273. See Banks v. Wolk, 918 F.2d 418, 420-22 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying multifactor
test to both continuity and relatedness prongs); Brandenburg v. Seider, 859 F.2d 1179,
1185 (4th Cir. 1988) (accounting for number of victims, number of schemes, number
of predicate acts, length of time, and potential for more criminal activity); Morgan v.
Bank of Waukegan, 804 F.2d 970, 975 (7th Cir. 1986) (enumerating variety of factors).
274. See Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-61 (1952) (describing his-
tory of mens rea in Anglo-American criminal law, and distinguishing common law crimes
requiring criminal intent, from regulatory offenses that do not require mens rea element
if none is specified); Fricker & Gilchrist, supra note 41, at 820 (describing lack of clear
distinction between regulatory and common law offenses). In United States v. X-Citement
Video, the Supreme Court held that in federal statutes lacking an explicit mens rea term,
one is implied if the statute criminalizes otherwise innocent conduct. 115 S. Ct. 464,
469 (1994). Jurisdictional facts that augment the penalty for an offense committed
intentionally, such as an intentional assault committed on someone who happened to
be a federal officer, do not require intent. Id. at 469 n.3. The Supreme Court found
that prior decisions had held that severe penalties in the statute were significant in
determining if there should be an implicit requirement of criminal intent. Id.
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robbery or arson, require that a defendant have criminal in-
tent.275 Some courts contend that the intent to commit predi-
cate acts is sufficient intent for conviction under RICO.276 Other
courts require that a defendant know of the RICO enterprise
and engage in the pattern of racketeering that was related to the
affairs of enterprise or that affected the affairs of the enter-
prise.277
B. Civil Law approach to Criminal Association
Italy and France are civil law countries in which legislative
enactments, not judicial decisions, are the primary source of
law.2 78 The penal codes of both Italy and France contain provi-
sions prohibiting criminal associations.2 79 The Italian code also
contains a specific prohibition on membership in a Mafia associ-
ation.2 8 ° The French law prohibiting criminal associations re-
sembles common law conspiracy,28 ' but retains the essential fea-
tures of traditional criminal association.282
Conspiracy is a product of the common law.283 Civil law
275. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). In some circuits, until 1984, a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 186, a RICO predicate act under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), did not require proof of a mens
rea element. United States v. Scotto, 641 F.2d 47, 55 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981). Defendants have argued that RICO convictions without proof of mens rea is
patently unfair. United States v. Boylan, 620 F.2d 359, 361-62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 833 (1980); Scotto, 641 F.2d at 55-56; United States v. Romano, 684 F.2d 1057, 1065-
66 (2d Cir. 1982).
276. Scotto, 641 F.2d at 56; Boylan, 620 F.2d 361-62. Scotto and the line of cases that
follow it are of questionable value since Reves implicitly overruled them. United States v.
Viola, 35 F.3d 37, 40-41 (2d Cir. 1994).
277. Castellano, 610 F.Supp. at 1395; see Lynch, supra note 5, at 954 n.149 (arguing
that convicting defendants without establishing awareness of enterprise strips enter-
prise element of any meaning).
278. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAw TRADITION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 23 (2d ed. 1985).
279. CODICE PENALE [C.P.] art. 416 (It.); CODE PtNAL [C. PIN.] art. 450-1 (Fr.).
280. C.P. art. 416bis (It.).
281. See Culioli, supra note 11, at 8 (describing abandonment of requirement that
criminal association be hierarchical and permanent, and new requirement that group
be based on agreement)
282. See Wagner, supra note 11 at 171 (discussing basis of French criminal associa-
tion statute).
283. See Wagner, supra note 11, at 171 (discussing civil law countries and conspir-
acy). The absence of conspiracy statutes in civil law countries became an obstacle to the
prosecutors of the Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. B.F. SMITH, REACHING JUDGMENT AT Nu-
REMBERG 51 (1977).
During much of the discussion, the Russians and French seemed unable to
grasp all the implications of [conspiracy]; when they finally did grasp it, they
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countries punish criminal groups directly by prohibiting the for-
mation of criminal associations.284 Common law conspiracy de-
pends upon the formation of a conspiratorial agreement,285 not
the criminal group that the agreement creates.286 The penal
codes of France 287 and Italy288 directly attack the formation of
the criminal groups, rather than the criminal agreement that un-
derlies the group.289
In civil law countries, such as Italy and France, codified leg-
islation is the primary source of law.2 90 In theory, judges inter-
pret and apply the rules set out in codes.2 9 1 Strict adherence to
the separation of powers in civil law countries means that only
the legislature has the right to make new law.292 Consequently,
judicial decisions in civil law countries do not create new law as
they do in common law countries. 93 In practice, however, legal
codes require the judiciary to fill in gaps left by legislators.294
While deferring to the law-making authority of the legislative
were genuinely shocked. The French viewed it entirely as a barbarous legal
anachronism unworthy of modem law, while the Soviets seem to have shaken
their heads in wonderment - a reaction, some cynics may believe, prompted by
envy.
Id.
284. Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 450 (Jackson,J. concurring); Wagner, supra note 11, at
171; see generally, ELISABETrA GRANDE, ACCORDO CRIMINOSO E CONSPIRACY (1993) (argu-
ing that common law conspiracy and Italian criminal association are different in theory
but similar in practice).
285. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text (discussing agreement as basis of
conspiracy).
286. Developments, supra note 40, at 934.
287. C. P9N. art. 450-1 (Fr.).
288. C.P. art. 416 (It.).
289. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 comment at 100-01 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960); 7
MANZINI supra note 11, at 193-96; "Association de Malfaiteurs" in RPERTOIRE DE DROIT
PtNAL ET DE PROCEDURE PENALE, supra note 11, at 8.
290. See MERRYMAN, supra note 278, at 23 (stating that sources of law in civil law
countries are statutes, regulations, and custom).
291. Id. at 22; but see ALAN WATSON, THE MAKING OF CIVIL LAw 3 (1981) (arguing
essential difference between common law and civil law systems is Roman heritage, not
codification).
292. MERRYMAN, supra note 278, at 22.
293. Id., at 46-47. There may, however, be continuity between judicial decisions
that, although not binding on judges, indicates the interpretation appellate courts will
be least likely to reverse. Id. at 47. Prior decisions may be persuasive, but are not bind-
ing. MAURICE SHELTON AMOS & FREDERICK PARKER WALTON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH
LAw 6-8 (1935).
294. See Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France for the Act of Things: A Study of
Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REv. 1299, 1305-13 (1988) (discussingjudiciary acting to
complete unfinished aspects of codes in civil law countries).
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branch, the legal interpretations of courts in civil law countries
may have the practical effect of creating new law.295
1. Italian Criminal Association Law
Italy prohibits groups organized for the purpose of commit-
ting crimes.296 It also prohibits groups such as the Mafia that use
intimidation to secure contracts and payoffs.297 Recently, the
Corte di Cassazione, the Italian Supreme Court, has allowed
prosecutors to charge people outside the Mafia as accomplices,
even if the Mafia has not accepted the accomplices as mem-
bers. 98
Article 416 of the Italian Penal Code makes it a crime, pun-
ishable by one to five years in prison, for three or more people
to associate for the purpose of engaging in criminal activity.299
Article 416 took effect when the current Italian Penal Code was
promulgated in 1931, but the provisions against criminal groups
derive from Roman law. °° In 1981, the Italian Legislature ad-
295. Id.
296. C.P. art. 416 (It.).
297. C.P. art. 416bis (It.).
298. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, in 1995 FORO IT.
II, 422.
299. C.P. art. 416 (It.).
Quando tre o piQ persone si associano allo scopo di commettere pia de-
litti, coloro che promuovono o costituiscono od organizzano l'associazione
sono puniti, per ci6 solo, con la reclusione da tre a sette anni.
Per il solo fatto di partecipare all'associazione, la pena i della reclusione
da uno a cinque anni.
Id.
[When three or more people associate for the purpose of committing a
number of crimes, those that promote, form or organize the association are
punished, for this alone, by imprisonment for from three to ten years.
For simply participating in the association, the punishment is imprison-
ment for from one to five years.] (Translation by Comment author).
300. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 192 n.3. From the time of the Roman Republic,
and particularly under the Roman Empire, Roman law punished certain criminal
groups considered a danger to the state. Id.; 1 THEODOR MOMMSEN, R6MISCHES
STRAFRECHT 662-63 (1899). Latrones, thieves, was a general term that applied to com-
mon thieves, bands of thieves, seditious organizations, and pretenders to the imperial
crown. RAMSAY MACMULLEN, ENEMIES OF THE ROMAN ORDER, Appendix B, 255-68; Ram-
say MacMullen, The Roman Concept Robber-Pretender, 10 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES
DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITE 223 (1963); see G.E.M. DE STE. CROIX, THE CLASS STRUGGLE IN
THE ANCIENT GREEK WORLD, 318 (1981) (discussing brigands and social revolution-
aries). Despite chronic problems with criminal groups, Roman law never developed a
distinct legal category for the crime of criminal association. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at
192, n.3. Medieval commentators placed complicity, conspiracy, and criminal associa-
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ded a provision extending the sanctions of article 416 to Mafia
associations, or groups that operate similarly to the Mafia.30 '
Throughout Italian history, the Italian countryside has suf-
fered from chronic and widespread brigandage, armed robber-
ies by rural bandits. 3 2 The number of brigands grew during pe-
riods when political regimes were unstable or unusually cor-
rupt.3 0 3 Many of the criminal organizations now operating in
Italian cities are the modern heirs to armed gangs that existed in
the countryside for centuries.30 4
Although Italy was a unified kingdom after 1861,305 there
was no national penal code until 1889.06 In the interim period,
tion under the rubric of societas sceleris, association of evildoers. Rosario Li Vecchi, Ma-
fia, Politica, Pentitimo, Tangentopoli e Loro Trattamento Processuale e Penale, 1994 RaviSTA
PENALE 1188, 1188.
301. Law n.646 of 13 September 1982, 9 Racc. Uff. 2537 (1982) (It.).
302. SeeJOHN A. DAVIS, CONFLICT AND CONTROL: LAW AND ORDER IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY ITALY 67-80 (1988) (describing relation of brigandage to social problems);
DENIS MACK SMITH, ITALY. A MODERN HISTORY 69-73, 82-83 (2d ed. 1969) (discussing
governmental mismanagement and chronic brigandage in south of Italy following
reunification); E.J. HOBSBAWM, PRIMITIVE REBELS: STUDIES IN ARCHAIC FORMS OF SOCIAL
MOVEMENT IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES 13-57 (Frederick A. Praeger 2d ed. 1963)
(1959) (linking Mafia and Italian brigandage to traditions of rebellion); 7 MANZINI,
supra note 11, at 211 n. I (describing periods of increased brigandage and use of law of
criminal association). Under medieval law in the Italian Peninsula, communities could
banish, bandire, criminals, declare them bandits with the status of outlaws, and put them
beyond the protection of the law. DAVIS, supra at 73. Outlawry in England was a similar
legal practice. See SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 1 HISTORY OF
ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 49 (2d ed. 1932) (describing outlaws de-
clared outside king's protection and liable to be killed on sight). In medieval Italy,
banditry was a status, not a crime, but if bandits joined together, their mere association
was the crime of brigandage. DAVIS supra at 72-75. As the state centralized police pow-
ers, relieving the rural aristocracy of enforcing criminal laws, the state came to treat
brigandage as a more serious offence. Id. at 73-75.
303. See HOBSBAWM, supra note 302, at 13-25 (discussing relationship of bandits as
avengers of impoverished peasants); SMITH, supra note 302, at 70-71 (describing upris-
ing in reaction to political mismanagement).
304. See ALEXANDER STILLE, EXCELLENT CADAVERS: THE MAFIA AND THE DEATH OF
THE FIRST ITALIAN REPUBLIC 14-22 (1995) (describing Mafia's history and influence over
growth of Palermo); HOBSBAWM supra note 302, at 40-44 (discussing origins of Mafia).
305. SMITH supra note 302, at 5-6, 27-28. The separate regions of the Italian Penin-
sula, except for Rome and Venice, became a united Kingdom of Italy in 1861 under
King Vittorio Emanuele II. Id.
306. Giuliano Vassalli, Codice Penale, in 7 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRrrTo 261, 264-65
(Giuffr ed., 1960). Between 1861 and 1889, a modified Tuscan penal code applied to
Tuscany, and the Sardo-Italian penal code applied to the rest of Italy. Id. at 264. The
major obstacle to a unitary code was the death penalty, which Tuscany had abolished as
incompatible with independence and liberty, but which still existed in other parts of
the country and was used against brigands in the South. Id. The Sardo-Italian Penal
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Tuscany had its own penal code."°7 The Tuscan Code of 1853
punished associations of three or more people who joined to-
gether to commit thievery, extortion, piracy, swindles, maritime
embezzlement, or fraud. 08 The Sardo-Italian Code of 1859 gov-
erned the rest of Italy.309 The Sardo-Italian Code criminalized
belonging to an associazione di malfattori, an association of evildo-
ers, composed of five or more people whose aim was to commit
crimes against people or property and to divide the spoils of
their crimes. 310 The national penal code of 1889, the Zanardelli
Code,311 created the crime of associazione per delinquere, criminal
association.3 12  The Rocco3 13 code of 1931,314 expanded the
crime of criminal association that the Zanardelli code estab-
Code imposed decapitation for attempts on the sacred person of the king, attempts on
the royal family, corruption of ajudge, false testimony leading to an execution, or cer-
tain enumerated types of homicide. C.P. art. 14 (1859) (It.) (Vincenzo Consentino ed.,
1879).
307. Vassalli, supra note 306, at 264.
308. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 192.
309. Vassalli, supra note 306, at 264.
310. C.P. arts. 426-30 (1859) (It.).
311. Vassalli, supra note 306, at 266. In 1883, Giuseppe Zanardelli, the Italian Min-
ister of justice, was instrumental in completing the new penal code. Id.
312. C.P. art. 248 (1889) (It.) (Emilio Camous and Giovanni Luschi eds., 1895).
Quando cinque o piii persone si associano per commettere delitti contro
l'amministrazione della giustizia, o la fede pubblica, o l'incolumitA pubblica, o
il buon constume e l'ordine delle famiglie, o contro la persona o la proprietA,
ciascuna di esse punita, per il solo fatto dell'associazione, con la reclusione
da uno a cinque anni.
Se gli associati scorrano le campagne o le pubbliche vie, e se due o pifi di
essi portino armi o le tengano in luogo di deposito, la pena della reclusione
da tre a dieci anni.
Se vi siano promotori o capi dell'associazione, la pena per essi della
reclusione da tre a otto anni, nel caso indicato nella prima parte del presente
articolo, e da cinque a dodici anni, nel caso indicato nel precedente
capoverso.
Id.
[When five or more people associate together to commit crimes against
the administration ofjustice, or the public trust, or public safety, or the well-
being and order of the family, or against persons or property, each of the
members is punished, for the fact of having associated, by imprisonment for
one to five years.
If the associates overrun the countryside or the public roadways, and if
two or more of them are armed or have a cache of arms, the punishment is
imprisonment for three to ten years.
If they are organizers or leaders of the association, the punishement is
from three to eight years for acts under paragraph one of this article, and
from five to twelve years for acts under paragraph two of this arti-
cle.] (translation by Comment author).
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lished.3 1t
Unlike the legal systems of common law countries, under
Italian law, the government cannot convict a person for merely
agreeing to commit a crime.31 6 The focus of article 416, there-
fore, is on the creation of an independent organization, not on
the agreement alone. 17 There is no specific structural require-
ment for the criminal association 3 1 under Italian law, as long as
there is a permanent3 19 group of at least three people dedicated
313. Vassalli, supra note 306, at 271-72. Italian Minister of Justice Alfredo Rocco
oversaw the creation of the new code. Id.
314. Id. at 272. On July 1, 1931, the Rocco Code took effect. Id.
315. 7 MANZINI supra note 11, at 192.
Quando tre o piCi persone si associano allo scopo di commettere pii de-
litti, coloro che promuovono o costituiscono od organizzano I'associazione
sono puniti, per ci6 solo, con ]a reclusione da tre a sette anni.
Per il solo fatto di participare all'associazione, la pena della reclusione
da uno a cinque anni.
Se gli associati scorrono in armi le campagne o le pubbliche vie si applica
la reclusione da cinque a quindici anni.
La pena aumentata se il numero degli associati di dieci o pia.
Id.
[When three or more people unite to commit a number of crimes, those
that encourage or create or organize the association are punished, for this
alone, with imprisonment from three to seven years.
For having merely belonged to the association, the punishment is impris-
onment form one to five years.
If the associates are armed and overrun the countryside or the public
roadways, imprisonment form five to fifteen years is to be given.
The punishment is increased if there are more than ten associates.]
(Translation by Comment author).
C.P. art. 416 (It.).
316. C.P. art. 115 (It.). "Salvo che la legge disponga altrimenti, qualora due o pia
persone si accordino allo scopo di commettere un reato, e questo non sia commesso,
nessuna di esse punibile per il solo fatto dell'accordo." Id. [Unless otherwise specified
by statute, if two or more persons agree to commit a crime but the crime remains unex-
ecuted, no one may be punished for merely the agreement.] (translation by Comment
author).
317. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 197. Article 416, in conjunction with the laws
against attempt, may be useful in punishing inchoate crimes by allowing the police to
intervene early enough to prevent the association from committing the target offenses.
See GRANDE, supra note 284, at 190-209 (describing legal basis for early police interven-
tion).
318. Laura Borroni, Tendenze Evolutive della Giurisprudenza in Tema di Mafia, 1990
GIURISPRUDENTA COSrITUZIONALE 3367, 3373 (1990).
319. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 195.
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to committing an open-ended series of crimes.3 2° The criminal
organization needs only a rudimentary structure, sufficient to
commit the target crimes.3 2' Formal organizations, such as cor-
porations, may be criminal associations if their members decide
as a group to commit crimes. 22
Each member of the criminal association must join the or-
ganization voluntarily.12 3 The members must agree to pursue
the shared criminal goal of the group.324 The members must
intend to engage in a continuous course of criminal conduct, 325
for if they plan only a fixed number of crimes or commit isolated
criminal acts, they are guilty as accomplices, not as members of
the criminal association. 26
In 1982, the Italian Legislature added the crime of associa-
327nacoeaarilzione tipo mafioso, Mafia association, to the penal code as article416bis.32 s Under article 416bis, members of a Mafia association
320. Id. at 195; CODICE PENALE ANNOTATO CON LA DOTTRINA E LA GIURISPRUDENZA
art. 416-17 (Antonio S. Agr6 et al. eds., 1984) (It.).
321. 7 MANZINI, supra note 11, at 195.
322. See id., at 197 (noting teleological aspect of organization is irrelevant because
intent to commit crimes supercedes original purpose of organization).
323. Id. at 195.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 194.
326. Id. at 195, 202.
327. Law n.646 of 13 September 1982, 9 Racc. Uff. 2537 (1982) (It.).
328. C.P. art. 416bis (It.).
Chiunque fa parte di un'associazione di tipo mafioso formata da tre o pifi
persone, punito con la reclusione da tre a sei anni.... L'associazione 6 di
tipo mafioso quando coloro che ne fanno parte si awalgono della forza di
intimidazione del vincolo associativo e della condizione di assoggettamento e
di omertA che ne deriva per commettere delitti, per acquisire in modo diretto
o indiretto la gestione o comunque il controllo di attiviti economiche, di con-
cessioni, di autorizzazioni, appalti e servizi pubblici o per realizzare profitti o
vantaggi ingiusti per s4 o per altri.... Le disposizioni del presente articolo si
applicano anche alla camorra e alle altre associazioni, comunque localmente
denominate, che valendosi della forza intimidatrice del vincolo associativo
perseguono scopi corrispondenti a quelli delle associazioni di tipo mafioso.
Id.
[Whoever belongs to a Mafia association comprised of three or more people,
is punished by imprisonment for three to six years .... An association is a
Mafia association when those that belong to it use the power of intimidation of
the associative bond, and the power of oppression, and the code of silence
that comes from the bond in order to commit crimes, to acquire by direct or
indirect means the management or at least the control over economic activity,
permits, authorizations, bids, and public contracts or to gain unjust favors or
profits for oneself or others.... The provisions of this article also apply to the
Camorra and other associations, regardless of their local titles, that use the
19961
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can be sentenced to serve three to six years in prison for forming
a criminal association and carrying out crimes by methods that
are considered characteristic of the Mafia,32 9 such as the use of
intimidation to acquire government contracts.33 ° Prior to the
addition of article 416bis, prosecutors in Italy, like U.S. prosecu-
tors, had been hindered from prosecuting Mafia leaders by,
among other things, the Mafia organizational hierarchy that in-
sulated bosses from the subordinates that committed street
crimes.331 Under 416bis, a group of three or more people that
uses intimidation to commit crimes, or gain control over busi-
nesses or public contracts may be a Mafia association.3 2
In 1994, the Corte di Cassazione, 3 in an en banc deci-
sion, 33 allowed prosecutors to link the Mafia-association statute
with the complicity statute.333 Carmine Alfieri, the chief of the
Neapolitan Camorra criminal organization, protected the mem-
bers of his gang from criminal convictions by bribing local
judges. -36
Alfieri's assistant, Carmine Grasso, became a government
force of intimidation of the associative bond to follow the same goals as a
Mafia association.] (Translation by Comment author).
Id.
329. C.i. art. 416his (It.).
330. Id. Article 416bis also introduces asset forfeiture into Italian law, borrowing
from RICO. Giovanni Tessitore, La Nuove Legge Antimafia e il Precedente <<Modello>
Americano: Spunti Comparativistici, 1984 Rrv. IT. D DHRrTro E PROCEDURA PENALE 1038
(1984).
331. Giuseppe Di Lello Finuoli, Associazione di tipo mafioso (art. 416 bis c.p.) e
problema probatorio, 1984 FORO IT. Parte V-I, 246, 246. Under 416bis the loose structural
element of the traditional associazione per delinquere combined with the sociological spec-
ifications describing the Mafia to allow prosecutors to bring enormous maxiprocessi,
maxi-trials, of hundreds of defendants tried simultaneously. See Stille, supra note 304, at
174-89 (describing original maxi-trial of 475 defendants).
332. C.P. art. 416bis (It.).
333. See Santo F. Russo, Comment, In Re Extradition of Khaled Mohammed ElJassem:
The Demise of the Political Offense Provision in U.S.-Italian Relations, 16 FORDHAM INT'L LJ.
1253, 1257 n.15 (1993) (describing system of Italian Criminal Courts).
334. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Unite, in
1995 FORO IT. II, 422. There are eight sections of the Corte di Cassazione that deal with
civil matters and six that deal with criminal matters. Ottavio Campanella, The Italian
Legal Profession, 19J. LEGAL PROF. 59, 79 (1995). Fivejudges sit in each section. Id. In a
sezioni unite session, 11 judges, sitting en banc preside over the matter. Id.
335. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Unite, in
1995 FORO IT. II, 422.
336. Due arrestati dopo le accuse del pentito Galasso - Coinvolti parlamentari, avvocati e un
giornalista; Camorra, i tempesta sui magistrati, IL SOLE 24 ORE, Mar. 8, 1994, available in
LEXIS, World Library, Stampa File.
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witness and accused Vito Masi, a judge on the Naples Court of
Appeals of having accepted bribes from the Camorra. 37 Grasso
dealt with Judge Masi through Giuseppe Demitry, a Socialist
Deputy in the Italian National Assembly. 338 Grasso claimed that
Demitry was an intermediary, who helped to "adjust" criminal
trials of Camorra members.339
Under Italian law, criminal association laws, such as articles
416 and 416bis are group crimes, reati plurisoggetivi14' Group
crimes, such as criminal association, duelling, and adultery, by
their nature, cannot be committed by one person.341 Crimes
that are not, by their nature, group crimes, such as murder, may
nevertheless be committed by accomplices acting as a group.342
Under Italian law, accomplices are held liable as principals in
the commission of a crime. 43 Complicity, therefore, creates
group liability for crimes that are not inherently group crimes,
but that, in particular instances, may be committed by a
group.3
Prosecutors, however, charged Demitry as an accomplice to
a Mafia organization. 43 In earlier decisions, sections of the
Corte di Cassazione had held that a defendant could not be
complicit with a criminal association,346 because aiding the asso-
ciation, with the intent to help it commit crimes, made one a
member of the association. 34" The Court had held that one
could join in a group crime, and, for example, be a member of a
criminal association, but one could not be complicit in a group
crime.348 Prosecutors, however, linked the complicity statute349
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Unite
Penali, in 1995 FORO IT. II, 422.
340. Id. at 426.
341. Raul Alberto Frosali, Concorso di Persone nel Reato, 3 NoVIssIMo DIGESTO
ITALiANo 1018, 1037-38 (Antonio Azara & Ernesto Eula eds., 1964).
342. Id.
343. C.p. art. 110 (It.).
344. Frosali, supra note 341, at 1019.
345. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, Sezione Unite
Penali, in 1995 FORO IT. II, 423.
346. Id. at 426.
347. Id.;Judgment of 30 June 1994, Corte di Cassazione, in 1995 RrViSTA PENALE
1114, 1116.
348. Judgment of 5 October 1994, Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Unite, in 1995 FORO
IT. II, 422.
349. C.P. art. 110 (It.).
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with the Mafia association statute in order to hold defendants
liable as outside associates of the Mafia who were liable under
the doctrine of external complicity.3 50 The Corte di Cassazione
found that criminal organizations sometimes require the assist-
ance of outsiders, who do not intend to join the organization
and are not treated as members, but may nevertheless perform
an isolated act, vital to the existence of the organization.35 1 The
doctrine of external complicity imposes the penalties for Mafia
membership on outsiders who aid and abet the Mafia.352
2. French Criminal Association Law
The Napoleonic Penal Code of 1811 33 contained the first
French law proscribing organized criminal groups.3 54 The law
applied only to criminal organizations with a formal structure
and did not reach loosely organized criminal groups.355 When
the laws against complicity, attempt, and criminal association
proved ineffective against anarchist groups in the late nine-
teenth century,35 6 the French Parliament revised the Penal Code
to remove the structural requirements from the law, and based
350. Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassazione, Sez. Unite, in
1995 FoRo IT. II, 422, 423. External complicity refers to aid from an accomplice who is
outside the association. Id.
351. Id. The Court found:
Il concorrente eventuale ... per definizione, colui che non vuole far parte
della associazione e che I'associazione non chiama a "far parte," ma, al quale si
rivolge sia, ad esempio, per colmare temporanei vuoti in un determinato
ruolo, sia, soprattutto - e il caso, come quello di specie, dell"'aggiustamento"
di un processo risponde a questa logica - nel momento in cui la "fisiologia"
dell'associazione entra in fibrillazione, attraversa una fase patologica, che, per
essere superata, esige il contributo temporaneo, limitato, di un esterno.
Id.
[The adventitious accomplice is... by definition, one who does not want to
belong to the association and whom the association does not ask to "join in,"
but rather to supply a temporary need in a particular role, but above all - in
the matter at hand, the "adjusting" of a case falls into this category - when
the "physiology" of the association goes into fibrillation during a pathological
period. To overcome it, the association requires a temporary, limited contri-
bution from an outsider] (translation by Comment author).
Id.
352. Id.; Francesco Palazzo, La lgislation italienne contre la criminaliti organisie, 1995
REVUE DE SCIENCE CRIMINEILE ET DE DROIT PENAL COMPARE 711, 714.
353. Loi du 12 Fev. 1810, 11 Bulletin des Lois n. 277bis at 1 (1810).
354. C. PfN. ANNOTt 930 (tmile Garcon 1952) (Fr.).
355. Id. at 931.
356. Id.
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the criminal group primarily on the criminal agreement.35 7
Under the French Penal Code of 1994,58 the French Parliament
expanded the number of target offenses3 9 of criminal associa-
tions, but the basic structure of the statute remained un-
changed.360
After the French Revolution, 361 Napoleon suppressed the
brigandage that had arisen in the French countryside.3 16  The
Penal Code of 1811 contained provisions against hierarchically
organized criminal groups.3 63 Articles 265-68 of the 1811 Penal
Code applied to criminal groups in which there were chiefs and
subordinates, and in which the brigands organized the division
of their spoils.3 64 The statute had provisions for aiders and abet-
357. C. PaN. ANNOTE (Emile Gar~on 1952) arts. 265-68 (Fr.); Culioli, supra note 11,
at 5.
358. Loi n.92-1336 of 16 Dec. 1992, art. 373,J.O. at 17586, 23 Dec. 1992, modified
by loi n.93-913 of 19 July 1993, J.O. at 10199, 20Jull. 1993.
359. C. PEN. art. 450-1 (Fr.).
360. Vitu, supra note 22, at 6.
361. C. PIN. ANNOTt arts. 265-68 (tmile Garcon 1952) (Fr.); GEORGES LEFEBVRE,
NAPOLEON: FROM 18 BRUMAIRE TO TILSIT 1799-1807 127-30 (Henry F. Stockhold trans.,
5th ed. 1969) (1965).
362. C. PfN. ANNOT9 arts. 265-68 (9mile Gargon 1952) (Fr.); LEFEBVRE, supra, note
361, at 127-30.
363. Culioli, supra note 11, at 4. The most famous of these bands of brigands were
the "chauffeurs." C. PtN. ANNOTt arts. 265-68 (Emile Garcon 1952) (Fr.); GEORGES LE-
FEBV'RE, supra note 361, at 127-30; see "Chauffeurs," 3 GRAND DICrIONNAIRE UNIVERSEL DU
XIXE SIJ CLE 1100 (Larousse, 1982) (describing "chauffeurs" as bandits who forced their
victims' feet into hot stoves to compel the victims to divulge the hiding places of valu-
ables).
364. C. PtN. arts. 265-68 (1811) (Fr.). Articles 265-68 state:
Art. 265: "Toute association de malfaiteurs envers les personnes ou les
propri&t~s est un crime contre la paix publique."
Art. 266: "Ce crime existe par le seul fait d'organisation de bandes ou de cor-
respondance entre elles et leurs chefs ou commandants, ou de conventions
tendant A rendre compte ou A faire distribution ou partage du produit des
m~faits."
Art. 267: "Quand ce crime n'aurait &6 accompagno ni suivi d'aucun autre, les
auteurs, directeurs de I'association, et les commandants en chef ou en sous-
ordre de ces bandes, seront punis des travaux forces A temps."
Art. 268: "Seront punis de la reclusion tous autres individus charges d'un ser-
vice quelconque dans ces bandes, et ceux qui auront sciemment et volontaire-
ment fourni aux bandes ou A! leurs divisions, des armes, munitions, instru-
ments du crime, logement, retraite ou lieu de reunion."
Id.
[Art. 265: Every association of those who would commit crimes against persons
or property is a crime against the public peace.
Art. 266: The crime is complete when the group is organized, or there is corre-
spondence between the groups and their leaders or commanders, or by gath-
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ters who freely and knowingly provided the criminal association
with weapons or lodging.3
65
In 1893, in response to a series of anarchist attacks,366 the
French Parliament revised the statute prohibiting criminal as-
sociations.3 67 The old statute requiring that criminal associa-
tions have chiefs and subordinates was inapplicable to anarchist
erings to settle accounts or to distribute or divide the gains from their mis-
deeds.
Art. 267: When no one else has joined or followed in the crime, the principals,
the directors of the association, and the commanders in chief or those of
lower rank, shall be punished by forced labor.
Art. 268: All other individuals who provided any service whatsoever to the
gangs, and those who freely and knowingly provided the gangs or their divi-
sions with arms, munitions, instruments of crimes, lodgings, hiding places, or
meeting places, shall be incarcerated.] (translation by Comment author).
Courts found that the statute implicitly required that the group be large, fairly perma-
nent, hierarchically organized, and composed of people with a criminal past. Vitu,
supra note 22, at 5-6.
365. C. PEN. art. 268 (1811) (Fr.).
366. 1 C. PEN. ANNOTk arts. 265-68 (Garon 1952) (Fr.); MAURICE GARCON, His-
TOIRE DE LAJUSTICE SOUS LA IIIE REPUBLIQUE 221-263 (Arth~me Fayard 1957); PETER
KROPOTKIN, MEMOIRS OF A REVOLUTIONIST 283-89 (James Allen Rogers ed., Anchor
Books 1962);JOAN UNGERSMA HALPERIN, FtLIX FtNON, AESTHETE AND ARTIST IN FIN-DE-
SItCLE PARIS 241-78 (1988). Anarchists defended the attacks as "propaganda by deed,"
a means of raising public awareness of the anarchists' determined opposition to the
oppressive social structure. JAMESJOLL, THE ANARCHISTS 121 (Universal Library 1972)
(1964). Under the Sardo-Italian Penal Code of 1859, anarchist groups committing
political crimes could not be prosecuted under Article 426, which punished only ordi-
nary, non-political criminal associations. RICHARD HOSTETTER, THE ITALIAN SOCIALIST
MOVEMENT I: ORIGINS (1860-1882) 405 n.79 (1958). Other anarchist attacks of that era
included the 1878 bombing of the funeral parade in Florence of King Victor Emman-
uel II of Italy, an 1886 attack on the Paris stock exchange by Charles Gallo, who flung
sulfuric acid at the brokers then fired several shots from a revolver, an 1893 bombing of
the French Chamber of Deputies by Auguste Vaillant, the 1894 murder of French Presi-
dent Sadie Carnot, a crime spree by FranCois-Claudius Ravachol, and several notorious
bombings by Emile Henry. JOLL, supra, at 123-45. In the United States, popular opinion
attributed to anarchists the Haymarket riot, the attempted assassination of Coal Mag-
nate Henry Frick, and the assassination of U.S. President William McKinley by Polish
immigrant Leon Czolgosz. E.g., Dennis v. United States 341 U.S. 494, 562-64 (1951)
(Jackson, J., concurring). Santo Jeronimon Caserio killed French President Sadie
Carnot in Lyons. HISTOIRE DE LA JUSTICE SOUS LA IIIE REPUBLIQUE, supra, at 235-36.
Caserio ran up to the presidential carriage, leaned in, and shouted "vive l'anarchie" as
he stabbed Carnot. Id. Carnot had recently refused to commute the captial sentence
ofAuguste Vaillant, who had bombed the French Chamber of Deputies but caused only
property damage. HALPERIN, supra, at 273.
367. Law of 13 Dec. 1893, IV D.P. IV 9 (1894) (Fr.). The National Assembly also
modified articles of the Penal Code dealing with detonating explosives, incitement to
violence, storing explosives, and anarchist propaganda. Vitu, supra note 22, at 4. The
French left dubbed these the Lois scdlrates, wicked laws. Id.; HISTOIRE DE LAJUSTICE SOUS
LA IIIE REPUBLIQUE, supra note 366, at 232, 263.
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groups, which strategically and philosophically opposed organi-
zational hierarchies."' 8 The revised articles 265-68 eliminated
the requirement that a criminal association have a formal struc-
ture. 69 Under the revised articles, an agreement to commit seri-
ous crimes370 could create a criminal association whose members
could be sentenced to hard labor.3 71 The law no longer re-
quired a specified number of members, a hierarchy, or a division
of spoils, 3 72 but it retained the earlier provision extending liabil-
ity to aiders and abettors.3 73 In 1981, the Parliament added a
requirement that the defendants must commit at least one overt
act in furtherance of the criminal association. 74
368. 1 C. PtN. ANNOTt arts. 265-68 (Garvon 1952) (Fr.); 1 TRAITt DE DROIT
CRIMINEL, DROIT PtNAL SPtCIAL, 178 (Roger Merle & Andr6 Vitu eds., 4th ed. 1981).
369. 1 C. Pt.N. ANNOTt arts. 265-68 (Garon 1952) (Fr.); Culioli, supra note 11, at 5.
In 1894, the Government tried to prosecute as an association de malfaiteurs, a mixed
group of defendants, some the government accused of violent crimes, others were art-
ists and intellectuals who had publicly encouraged anarchists. HISTOIRE DE [A JUSTICE
sous LA IIIE RtPUBLIQUE, supra note 366, at 238-42; HALPERIN, supra note 366, at 279-94.
The press called the trial the Proeds de Trente, because the prosecution had chosen to test
the new statute against association de malfaiteurs by charging thirty defendants.
HALPERIN, supra at 285-86. The Proes de Trente ended with the acquittal of those who
had merely advocated anarchy and the conviction of those who had been accused of
other substantive offenses. HISTOIRE DE LA JUSTICE SOUS LA TROISItME RIPUBLIQUE,
supra note 366, at 242. Critics viewed the trial as an unwarranted extension of the new
crime of association de malfaiteurs. Id. at 23942.
370. C. PeN. art. 265 (Fr.). In the French legal system, the term crime applies to
charges serious enough to warrant a full judicial proceeding before a Cours d'Assiz com-
posed of three professional judges and nine lay jurors. Edward A. Tomlinson,
NonadversarialJustice: The French Experience, 42 MD. L. REv. 131, 14243 (1983). A three-
judge tribunal judges dilits, less serious crimes. Id. at 142-44. For the final category of
legal violations, contraventions, a single judge in the tribunal de police may impose a fine.
Id. at 14245.
371. C. PtN. art. 265 (1893) (Fr.). "Toute association forme, quelle que soit sa
dur~e ou le nombre de ses membres, toute entente 6tablie dans le but de preparer ou
de commettre des crimes contre les personnes ou les propri&t~s, constituent un crime
contre la paix publique." Id. [Every association, regardless of the number of its mem-
bers, every understanding made with the goal preparing to commit or committing
crimes against people or property, is a crime against the public peace.] (translation by
Comment author). Courts rejected prosecutors' attempts to use the new law against
journalists who praised the anarchists' attacks on bourgeois culture. HISTOIRE DE LA
JUSTICE SOUS LA IIIE RIPUBLIQUE, supra note 366, at 242. Membership required more
than encouragement and ideological support. Id. at 238-42; JOLL, supra note 366, at
132-33.
372. 1 C. PtN. ANNOTt arts. 265-68 (Garon 1952) (Fr.).
373. C. PILN. art. 267 (Fr.).
374. Law n.81-82 of 2 February 1981, 1981 B.L.D. 86 (Fr.). The French National
Assembly, in revising Articles 265-68, expanded the number of target offenses to in-
clude enumerated dilits correctionnels, in addition to the more serious crimes, and made
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On March 1, 1994, a revised French Penal Code went into
effect.375 The current Code provisions against criminal associa-
tion, articles 450-1 to 450-3, expand the number of target of-
fenses to include delits3 76 punishable by 10 years in prison A77
The new Code also dispenses with the complicity provisions for
the criminal association statute, as it promulgated a general com-
plicity provision applicable to the entire Penal Code. 8
Under French law, a person who assists in the commission
of a crime may be liable as an accomplice.3 79 An accomplice acts
before or during the commission of the crime to assist the prin-
cipal, who commits the crime.38 ' The accomplice must know
that the principal intends to violate the law, and must intend to
participate in the violation.381 Complicity is distinct from other
group crimes committed by a mob, an insurrection, or a crimi-
nal association. 2 Criminal association, for example, is a crime
independent of the target offenses.3 83 A defendant can be com-
the offense of association de malfaiteurs either a crime or a dilit based on the severity of
the target offense. Id.; TRAITE DE DROIT CRIMINEL, supra note 368, at 179-82. In 1983,
the Parliament again restricted the target offenses to crimes. Law n.83-466 of 10 June
1983, 1983J.0. 11Juin, 1755 (Fr.). Three years later, it reinstated the changes made in
1981. Law n.86-1019 of 9 September 1986, 1986J.O. 10 Sept., 10,954 (Fr.).
375. Loi n.92-1336 of 16 Dec. 1992, art. 373, J.O. at 17,586, 23 Dec. 1992 (Fr.),
modified by loi n.93-913 of 19 July 1993, J.O. at 10,199, 20Jull. 1993 (Fr.).
376. See Tomlinson, supra note 370, at 144 (describing delits as less-serious offences
than crimes).
377. C. PEN. art. 401-1 (Fr.).
378. Culioli, supra note 11, at 16-17. The general complicity provisions in Articles
121-6 and 121-7 hold accomplices liable as the principal, unless the specific statute
states otherwise. C. pEN. art. 121-6.
379. C. PEN. art. 121-7 (Fr.).
380. Id. The Code defines accomplices as:
Est complice d'un crime ou d'un drlit la personne qui sciemment, par
aide ou assistance, en a facilit6 la preparation ou la consommation.
Est 6galement complice la personne qui, par don, promesse, menace, or-
dre, abus d'autorit6 ou de pouvoir aura provoqu6 A une infraction ou donn6
des instructions pour la commettre.
Id.
[A person is an accomplice to a crime or dilit if they knowingly, by help or
assistance, aided the preparation or commission of a crime.
A person is also an accomplice if by gift, promise, threat, order, or abuse of
power or authority provoked a violation of the law, or gave instructions for
such a violation) (translation by Comment author).
381. Philip Salvage, Complidti, in 1 JURIS-CLASSEUR PENAL 15-16 (1996).
382. Id. at 3. Underlying a mob, for example, is a sudden, collective impulse with-
out prior intent to violate the law. Id.
383. Id.
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plicit in a series of crimes with the same people, but unless he or
she joins a criminal group, the person is not guilty of criminal
association.
II. REVES v. ERNST & YOUNG
In Reves v. Ernst & Young, the Supreme Court limited liabil-
ity under § 1962(c) to people who operate or manage a RICO
enterprise. 85 The decision attempted to distinguish degrees of
involvement by outside professionals in enterprises for which
they provide professional services.3 8 6 The result, however, has
been to compel plaintiffs to modify their tactics to achieve the
result Reves was intended to prevent.3 7
A. History
In Reves v. Ernst & Young,388 the trustee in bankruptcy of a
Farmer's Cooperative (the "Co-op") brought a civil suit for se-
curities fraud and RICO violations against forty individuals and
entities, including Arthur Young & Co.389 In January 1980, the
Co-op general manager, Jack White, obtained loans from the Co-
op to finance construction of a gasohol plant 9 ° for his company,
White Flame Fuels, Inc. ("White Flame").391 In September 1980,
Jack White and the Co-op's accountant were indicted on charges
of tax fraud.3 92 A consent decree3 9 3 relieved White of his debts
384. Id. The time when the criminal association is discovered determines the na-
ture of the accomplice's offence. Vitu, supra note 22, at 10. If the defendant aided the
formation of the association, but did not join it, the defendant is complicit in the crime
of criminal association. Id. If the defendant also aids the criminal association to com-
mit a target offense, the defendant is complicit in the attempt or the commission of the
target offense, in addition to the crime of criminal association. Id.
385. 507 U.S. 170 (1993).
386. Id. at 184-85.
387. See DiSanto, supra note 18, at 1063 (noting the ways Reves can be circum-
vented).
388. Reves, 507 U.S. at 170.
389. Id. at 175. The original accounting firm was Russell Brown and Company,
which merged with Arthur Young and Company, later becoming Ernst & Young. Id. at
173.
390. Id. at 173. Gasohol is a motor fuel formed by blending nine parts gasoline
with one part grain alcohol. Greater Rockford Energy and Technology Corp. v. Shell
Oil Co., 998 F.2d 391, 393 (7th Cir. 1993), reh'g denied, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis 22560.
391. Reves, 507 U.S. at 172-73.
392. Id. at 173.
393. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 410-11 (6th ed. 1990) (defining consent decree
as "not properly ajudicial sentence; but is in the nature of a solemn contract or agree-
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to the Co-op and established the Co-op's ownership of the
gasohol company from February 1980.s3 4
In January 1981, Jack White and the Co-op accountant were
convicted of tax fraud. 9 5 At the criminal trial, Harry Erwin, the
managing partner of Russell Brown and Company testified on
Jack White's behalf.3 ' 6 After the trial, Jack White's lawyer con-
tacted Russell Brown to discuss retaining the firm to audit the
Co-op.397 Later that year, after members of Russell Brown had
met with Jack White and the Co-op's office manager, the Co-op
hired Russell Brown to perform the Co-op's 1981 audit.3 98
The valuation of the White Flame gasohol plant became a
key element of the audit, for if the plant was valued at less than
$1.5 million, the Co-op would be insolvent.399 On April 22,
1982, Arthur Young presented the 1981 audit to the Co-op
board.40 The audit treated White Flame as if the Co-op had
owned the plant since construction began in 1979, despite the
consent decree establishing ownership by the Co-op beginning
in 1980.401 For accounting purposes, White Flame was valued at
its fixed-asset value of $4.5 million.40 2 Arthur Young did not tell
the Co-op board that the valuation assumed that the Co-op had
always owned the gasohol plant and that without that assump-
tion, the accountants would have given the plant its fair market
value of $444,000 to $1.5 million, which would have left the Co-
op insolvent.403
At the 1982 Co-op annual meeting, Harry Erwin, now of Ar-
thur Young, presented condensed financial statements that gave
the Co-op a net worth of over $2.6 million.40 4 The condensed
ment between the parties, made under the sanction of the court, and in effect an admis-
sion by them that the decree is ajust determination of their rights upon the real facts of
the case.").
394. Reves, 507 U.S. at 173.
395. See United States v. White, 671 F.2d 1126 (8th Cir. 1982) (affirming convic-
tions for conspiring to defraud U.S. Government by impeding collection of taxes, and
for filing false and fraudulent tax returns for Co-op).
396. Arthur Young v. Reves, 937 F.2d 1310, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Reves, 507 U.S. at 174.
400. Id. at 174.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Reves, 507 U.S. at 174.
404. Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1318.
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financial statements failed to disclose the information about the
financial health of White Flame that had been in the full au-
dit.4 05 In response to questions from the audience, Erwin ex-
plained only that White Flame had lost approximately $1.2 mil-
lion, and did not discuss the details of the White Flame valua-
tion.40 6
Arthur Young also performed the 1982 audit, which again
showed a positive net worth for the Co-op based on the $4.5 mil-
lion value of the gasohol plant.407 Again, doubts about White
Flame's financial health were in a footnote in the audit that Ar-
thur Young omitted from the condensed financial statements
distributed at the Co-op annual meeting.40 In February 1984,
there was a run on the demand notes that the Co-op had issued,
and the Co-op was unable to secure further financing.409 The
Co-op filed for bankruptcy, freezing the demand notes in the
bankruptcy estate. 0
On behalf of the noteholders and the Co-op, the trustees in
bankruptcy brought suit against forty individuals and entities in-
cluding Arthur Young on state and federal securities fraud
claims and on a RICO claim.4 1' The District Court certified a
class of noteholders as plaintiffs.41 2 The plaintiffs settled with all
defendants except Arthur Young.41 The District Court granted
summary judgment for Arthur Young on the RICO claim, and
the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 1 4 The District
Court found that Arthur Young did not operate or manage the
Co-op, and therefore was not liable under § 1962(c) for partici-
pating in the conduct of the Co-op's affairs through a pattern of
racketeering. 41 5
405. Id. at 1318-19. Note 9 of the audit expressed Arthur Young's doubt that in-
vestment in White Flame could be recovered. Id.
406. Id. at 1319. The facts of the White Flame valuation were in the full financial
statement, which Erwin had not brought to the meeting. Id.
407. Reves, 507 U.S. at 175.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Reves, 507 U.S. at 175.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Arthur Young, 937 F.2d at 1323-24.
415. Reves, 507 U.S. at 176-77. The District Court applied the operation or man-
agement test and granted summary judgment in favor of Arthur Young. Id.
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B. The Operation or Management Test
At issue in Reves was what degree of participation made one
liable under § 1962(c) as a member of an association-in-fact
RICO enterprise. 1 6 Associates of a RICO enterprise are liable as
members of a RICO association-in-fact enterprise based on their
conduct or participation in the affairs of the enterprise.4" 7 Reves
defined the periphery of participation in an association-in-
fact.418 The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals.41 '9 Like the Court of Appeals and the
District Court, the Supreme Court applied the Eighth Circuit
test of Bennett v. Berg4 20 limiting RICO liability to those who have
a hand in the "operation or management" of the enterprise.42
1. Majority View
In interpreting § 1962(c), the Supreme Court first looked
to the statutory language.4 2 The Court's interpretation hinged
on the phrase in the statute that limits liability to those who par-
ticpate in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs.42 3  The Court
found that the word conduct indicates a degree of direction in
the affairs of the enterprise.42 4 The Court found that because
the word conduct appears twice,5 one of the terms would be
superfluous if it did not imply some degree of direction.426
Therefore, participating in the conduct of an enterprise's affairs
is narrower than simply participating in the affairs of the enter-
prise.427
The Court found that defining participation was more prob-
416. Id. at 172.
417. 18 U.S.C. 1962(c)(1996).
418. Reves, 507 U.S. at 170. Those beyond the periphery, whether outsiders, who
belong to another organization, or insignificant insiders, are not liable under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(c) because they do not operate or manage the enterprise. Id. at 176-77, 179.
419. Id. at 170.
420. Bennett v. Berg, 710 F.2d 1361, 1364 (8th Cir 1983).
421. Reves, 507 U.S. at 176-177, 179.
422. Reves, 507 U.S. at 177.
423. Id.
424. Id. at 177-78. The Court found that in defining the word conduct, "in the
context of the phrase 'to conduct... [an] enterprise's affairs,' the word indicates some
degree of direction." Id. at 178.
425. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The statute prohibits conducting or participating, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs. Id.
426. Reves, 507 U.S. at 178.
427. Id. at 178-79.
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lematic,428 but if conduct of an enterprise's affairs implies di-
recting the affairs, participation in the conduct of the enter-
prise's affairs meant that one participated in the direction of the
enterprise.4 29 The Court found that by extending liability to di-
rect or indirect participation, RICO reaches both insiders and
outsiders, if they direct the enterprise's affairs.430
The Court also looked to the legislative history of RICO to
support the operations or management test.431 Members of
Congress, during the floor debates, distinguished § 1962(c)
from § 1962(a) and (b) by describing the association-in-fact pro-
hibition in § 1962(c) as preventing the operation of an enter-
41~2prise. Congress, the Court stated, extended the list of predi-
cate acts to many crimes that were not necessarily characteristic
of organized crime, but limited RICO through other require-
ments, including § 1962.4aa
The Court rejected the claim that the liberal construction
clause in RICO required the Court to apply the statute
broadly.434 The Supreme Court explained that the liberal con-
struction clause was a reminder that courts should not frustrate
Congress' intent, not a license to apply the statute to unintended
ends. 435 The liberal construction clause was meant to resolve
ambiguity in favor of a broad construction, but as the Court
found the language of 1962(c) to be unambiguous, there was no
need to resort to the liberal construction clause.43 6
The Court observed that the operation or management test
does not limit liability to those in the upper ranks of an enter-
prise.131 Under Reves, even a lower-echelon member of an enter-
prise can be held to operate it.43 8 Outsiders can operate the en-
terprise if they are associated closely with it, for example,
428. Id. at 178.
429. Id. at 179. The Court stated that to participate is narrower than aiding and
abetting, and that "'to participate ... the conduct of... affairs' must be narrower than
'to participate in affairs' or Congress' repetition of the word 'conduct' could serve no
purpose." Id. at 178-79.
430. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179.
431. Id. at 179-83.
432. Id. at 182.
433. Id. at 183.
434. Reves, 507 U.S. at 183-84.
435. Id.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 184.
438. Id.; see United States v. Oreto, 37 F.3d 739, 750-51 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
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through bribery.439 The Court, however, limited the liability of
outsiders by finding that Congress addressed § 1962(a) and (b)
specifically to outsiders.440 Section 1962(c) had a more limited
reach. 44 1  Nevertheless, outsiders who associate themselves
closely enough with the enterprise can be liable if they operate
or manage the enterprise."2
2. Dissent
Justice Souter, joined by Justice White, dissented from the
majority opinion.448 While Justice Souter agreed with the
method the majority used to analyze the statutory language, he
found that the word "conduct" was broader than the majority
acknowledged. 4 " Justice Souter observed that the statute was
written to reach those who are merely associated with an enter-
prise in which they participated indirectly.445 The word conduct,
Justice Souter noted, is more inclusive than the majority's inter-
pretation, and extends to those who merely carry out an activ-
ity." Justice Souter found the language of § 1962(c) to be am-
biguous and looked to the liberal construction clause to resolve
questions in favor of a more inclusive reading. 7
Justice Souter also found that the actions of Arthur Young
met even the operation or management test of the majority.44
He noted that Arthur Young took on managerial responsibilities
when it created the financial statements it was hired to audit and
chose a value to assign to the White Flame gasohol plant.449 Jus-
tice Souter viewed Arthur Young's actions as impermissibly en-
115 S. Ct. 1161 (1995) (holding that implementing orders helpful to enterprise meets
Reves test).
439. Reves, 507 U.S. at 184.
440. Id. at 185.
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. Reves, 507 U.S. at 186 (SouterJ., dissenting).
444. Id. at 188.
445. Id. at 187-88.
446. Id. Justice Souter found, "it is hard to imagine how the 'operation or man-
agement' test would leave the statute with the capacity to reach the indirect participa-
tion of someone merely associated with an an enterprise.... [T] his contextual exami-
nation shows 'conduct' to have a long arm, unlimited by any requirement to prove that
the activity includes an element of direction." Id. at 188.
447. Reves, 507 U.S. at 189.
448. Id. at 189-95.
449. Id. at 189-90.
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croaching on management responsibilities, and, therefore,
meeting the operation or management test for participation in a
RICO association-in-fact. 450
3. Problems
Reves resolved the growing disagreement over the scope of
§ 1962(c), but recent cases have resurrected the dispute in dif-
ferent forms. 451 The operation or management test called for
defendants to play a managerial role in the enterprise, but the
breadth of the word "operation" undermines the certainty of the
test.452 The Supreme Court intended the "operation or manage-
ment" test of Reves to be a simple rule for courts to apply.453 The
effect, however, has been to create uncertainty in the courts
about the degree of participation required of a defendant to
meet the operation or management standard,45 4 whether the op-
eration or management test applies to criminal as well as to civil
RICO,4 5 and what importance courts should give to alternate
theories of participation.45 6
a. Extent of Liability
In United States v. Oreto, members of a loan sharking ring
were convicted under 1962(c) and (d). 457 The First Circuit
Court of Appeals interpreted Reves to apply specifically to "out-
sider" liability.458 The appellants in Oreto were subordinate
members of the ring, "insiders," and the court upheld their con-
victions on the theory that implementing decisions that are help-
ful to the enterprise is sufficient conduct under 1962(c).459
In Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. P & B Autobody,460 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals found that body shop owners directed
450. Id. at 189-95.
451. See DiSanto, supra note 18, at 1079-88 (describing inconsistent application of
Reves).
452. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 1397, 1400.
453. Reves, 507 U.S. at 179.
454. Vitiello, supra note 18, at 1367.
455. See Camp, supra note 18, at 87-92 (arguing for narrow reading of civil RICO
and broad reading of criminal RICO).
456. See Vitiello, supra note 18, at 1387-98 (discussing Reves in lower courts).
457. 37 F.3d 739 (1st Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1161 (1995).
458. Id.
459. Id. at 750.
460. 43 F.3d 1546 (1st Cir. 1994).
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the affairs of Aetna by filing fraudulent auto repair claims.461
Defendant auto body shops and their owners colluded with cor-
rupt Aetna insurance adjusters to submit false appraisals to
Aetna.4 6 2 Aetna alleged that Aetna was itself a RICO enterprise
under § 1962(c), and that the defendants directed Aetna's af-
fairs.4 6 ' The defendants, who were associated with the enter-
prise through the autos insured by Aetna that they purportedly
repaired, exerted sufficient direction over the insurance claims
process to meet the Reves standard.464
In United States v. Viola,465 the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed the conviction of a member of a gang that dealt in
stolen property because the appellant, Formisano, merely fol-
lowed orders and was not in a position to operate or manage the
466enterprise. Anthony Viola ran an enterprise near the Brook-
lyn waterfront that dealt in narcotics and stolen property.467
Michael Formisano was an employee of Viola's whose conviction
under §§ 1962(c) and (d) was based solely on two errands he
ran for Viola, transporting stolen beer and lamps to buyers.468
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals found that there was insuf-
ficient evidence to show that Formisano had sufficient discre-
tionary authority to operate or manage the enterprise, and that
his knowledge of the enterprise was too limited to convict him of
RICO conspiracy.469
b. Recasting the Enterprise
Although the Supreme Court limited liability to those who
operate or manage an association-in-fact enterprise,47 the RICO
enterprise may often accommodate different structures in which
participants may be either marginal outsiders or key operators
and managers.47' In DeWit v. Firstar,4 72 the trial court dismissed
461. Id. at 1552.
462. Id. at 1552.
463. Id.
464. Id. at 1559-60.
465. 35 F.3d 37 (2d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1270 (1995).
466. Id. at 43.
467. Id. at 39.
468. Id. at 43.
469. Id. at 43-45.
470. Reves, 507 U.S. at 185.
471. See Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Civil RICO after Reves: An Economic
Commentary, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 157, 193-94 (pointing out that Reves plaintiff could have
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the initial suit,47 on the grounds that the defendants had not, as
Reves requires, managed or operated the RICO enterprise.474 In
their amended complaint, the plaintiffs alleged that the enter-
prise consisted of a shifting group composed of banks, a bank
holding company, and constitutant banks.4 75  The court held
that the new enterprise met the Reves test, although the underly-
ing facts had not changed. 476
c. Aiding and Abetting under Reves
An aider and abetter of a federal crime, one who acts with
the intent to facilitate the offense committed by the principal, is
liable as a principal.477 The RICO enterprise that Congress orig-
inally envisioned had numerous associates peripherally involved
in its affairs.478 While they might not reach the level of manag-
ers, they nevertheless are essential to the enterprise and aid it
from the outside.479 The federal aiding and abetting statute al-
lows them to be convicted for their role in helping the RICO
enterprise.48 °
met operation or management test by alleging association-in-fact enterprise consisting
of Arthur Young, Jack White, and Co-op, directed by Arthur Young).
472. 904 F. Supp. 1476 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
473. De Wit v. Firstar Corp., 879 F. Supp. 947 (N.D. Iowa 1995).
474. Id. at 966.
475. DeWit, 904 F. Supp. at 1516.
476. Id. at 1516-19.
477. 18 U.S.C. § 2. An aider and abetter of a federal crime is liable as a principle.
Id. One can aid and abet a § 1962(c) RICO violation by aiding and abetting the com-
mission of two predicate acts. Peto-Tech Inc. v. Western Co. of N. Am., 824 F.2d 1349,
1356-57 (3d Cir. 1987)
478. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 132, at 4, 8-10, 51.
479. Id. at 51.
480. Jaguar Cars, Inc. v. Royal Oaks Motor Car Co., 46 F.3d 258, 270 (3d Cir.
1995); see, Judith L. Rosenthal, Comment, Aiding and Abetting Liability for Civil Violations
of RICO, 61 TEMP. L.Q. 1481, 1506-07 (1988) (arguing for criminal, not civil standards
for RICO aiding and abetting, but only for § 1962(a)). In 1994, however, the Supreme
Court in Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver held that a private plaintiff
cannot impose civil liability for aiding and abetting a violation of § 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. 511 U.S. 164, 191 (1994). The Court in Central Bank of
Denver found that the civil remedies for breach of the securities laws did not include
aiding and abetting. Criminal prosecution could invoke 18 U.S.C. § 2, but the civil
enforcement provisions could not. Commentators and several recent court decisions
have found that the principles of Central Bank of Denver limit aiding and abetting liabil-
ity for civil suits under RICO. In Re Lake State Commodities, 936 F. Supp. 1461, 1475
(N.D. Ill. 1996); Department of Economic Development v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 924
F. Supp. 449, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Taurie M. Zeitzer, Note, In Central Bank's Wake,
RICO's Voice Still Resonates: Are Civil Aiding and Abetting Claims Still Tenable, 29 COLUM.
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d. RICO Conspiracy
Section 1962(d) makes it unlawful for a person to conspire
to violate §§ 1962(a), (b) or (c). 481 Section 1962(d) follows
traditional conspiracy doctrine and prohibits the formation of
an agreement to violate the substantive sections of § 1962,482 re-
gardless of whether any substantive violations were commit-
ted.483 By alleging a RICO conspiracy, prosecutors can bypass
the limitations of Reves.48 4 Despite the fact that a conspiratorial
agreement is often narrower than a RICO enterprise, by alleging
a RICO conspiracy, prosecutors can reach non-managerial asso-
ciates of the enterprise who would escape liability under the
Reves test.485 The penalties for a RICO conspiracy conviction are
the same as for conviction for a substantive RICO violation.4 8 6
III. COMPARISON
Reves v. Ernst & Young, by limiting RICO liability under
§ 1962 (c) to those who operate or manage the RICO enterprise,
creates an anomalous limitation on the broad liability Congress
envisioned.487 As a result, civil plaintiffs have crafted RICO com-
plaints to avoid the limitations Reves created.48 8 In addition,
Reves has led courts to emphasize the distinction between insid-
ers, who are integral to the enterprise, and outsiders, who
merely provide, for example, professional services.489 French
and Italian criminal association laws provide examples of laws
directed at group criminality that recognize liability for attenu-
J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 551 (1996); Carrie E. Goodwin, Note, Central Bank v. First Interstate
Bank: Not Just the End of Aiding and Abetting Under Section 10(B), 52 WASH. & LEE L. REv.
1387, 1427-30 (1995);Jed S. Rakoff, Aiding and Abbetting Under Civil RICO, N.Y.L.J., May
12, 1994, at 3. There is a split in the circuits, and aiding and abetting a 1962(c) viola-
tion is still a tenable theory. Jaguar Cars Inc., 46 F.3d at 270-71.
481. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
482. United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 492 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
940 (1986).
483. Sutherland, 656 F.2d at 1186-87.
484. See DiSanto, supra note 18, at 1064 (observing common law crimes allow
plaintiffs to avoid Reves problems).
485. Id.
486. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1963-64.
487. See supra notes 451-80 and accompanying text (discussing result of Reves).
488. See supra notes 470-86 and accompanying text (discussing methods of avoid-
ing Reves limitations).
489. See Clarkin, supra note 213, at 1030-31, 1066-69 (discussing outside profes-
sionals and RICO liability).
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ated connections to the central criminal group.490 As U.S. fed-
eral law has interpreted conspiracy broadly, and held peripheral
figures liable for the crimes of the entire conspiratorial group,
courts should apply the exansive concepts of RICO to white-col-
lar criminals engaged in racketeering.
Under § 1962(d), a person can be liable for engaging in a
conspiracy to violate RICO's substantive provisions.491 Periph-
eral associates of an association-in-fact, particularly outside pro-
fessionals, may be aware of the racketeering scheme, provide
critical assistance, and yet not be parties to a conspiratorial
agreement that would fall under § 1962(d). After Reves, plain-
tiffs must recast the enterprise to bring the peripheral associates
into the center of a broader enterprise, or allege that the outsid-
ers aided and abetted the violation of § 1962(c).492 Reves, how-
ever, has accentuated the distinction between insiders, who be-
long to an organization, and outsiders, who have an occasional
relationship with the main group.493 The text of § 1962(c), how-
ever, provides for liability for those who participated directly or
indirectly in the enterprise's affairs, extending liability to periph-
eral associates. 4
Courts, however, should inquire specifically if the periph-
eral associates have the requisite mens rea for § 1962(c) liabil-
ity.495 The defendants must commit a pattern of predicate acts
that affect or are related to the affairs of an enterprise.496 The
defendant must know of the enterprise and commit the predi-
cate acts intentionally.
497
The French Penal Code holds peripheral associates liable as
490. See supra notes 345-52 (discussing extension of outsider liability for Mafia asso-
ciation in Italy); supra notes 361-84 (discussing French criminal association law and
complicity).
491. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d).
492. See supra notes 451-80 and accompanying text (discussing methods of bypas-
sing Reves obstacles).
493. See Oreto, 37 F.3d at 750 (describing Reves as case about outsiders, not insid-
ers).
494. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c).
495. See notes 274-77 and accompanying text (discussing RICO mens rea require-
ments).
496. See supra notes 255-59 and accompanying text (discussing nexus agreement).
497. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (discussing mens rea and RICO en-
terprise).
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aiders and abetters of criminal associations. 498 Like an illicit
RICO association-in-fact, a French criminal association is a dis-
tinct group engaged in criminal conduct.49 9 Similarly, a criminal
association in Italy must be a permanent group dedicated to car-
rying out a continuous course of criminal activity.50 Like Anglo-
American conspiracy, the French and Italian statutes envision
the criminal group as an organization composed of criminals
that agree to the goals of the group.50 1 Consequently, the
French and Italian statutes also contain provisions that extend
liability to accomplices who aid the group but are not accepted
as members.50 2 The threshold of acceptance into a common
law conspiracy is lower, however, because the conspiratorial
agreement is the only structural requirement, 50 3 and the agree-
ment does not require mutual acceptance by the new co-conspir-
ator and the criminal group.
50 4
Under § 1962(c), however, RICO applies not only to insid-
ers who belong to criminal groups, but also to criminals who
manipulate legitimate organizations from the outside.50 5 Many
of the complexities of RICO interpretation arise from the flexi-
ble link the statute allows between the racketeering activity and
the enterprise. 0 6 Criminal association laws do not have this
498. See supra notes 378-384 (discussing complicity with French criminal associa-
tion).
499. See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 660-64 (discussing requirements for association-
in-fact RICO enterprises); Vitu, supra note 22, at 6 (discussing requirements for French
criminal association).
500. See supra notes 323-26 and accompanying text (discussing membership in Ital-
ian criminal association).
501. See supra notes 40-98 and accompanying text (discussing types of conspirato-
rial groups); 7 MANZINI supra note 11, at 194-96 (describing adherence of members to
Italian criminal association); Judgment of 5 October 1994 (Demitry), Corte di Cassa-
zione, Sez. Unite, in 1995 FORO IT. II, 422, 435-36 (discussing membership in Italian
criminal association); Vitu, supra note 22, at 6 (describing elements of French criminal
association).
502. See supra notes 378-84 and accompanying text (discussing extension of out-
sider liability for Mafia association in Italy); supra notes 361-84 and accompanying text
(discussing complicity with French criminal association).
503. See supra notes 40-93 and accompanying text (discussing limits of conspirato-
rial liability).
504. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing conspiratorial agree-
ment as link between conspirators).
505. See O'Neill, supra note 7, at 674-77 (discussing relationship of racketeer to
enterprise).
506. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text (discussing nexus require-
ment).
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nexus requirement, and the criminal group is the organization
through which the crimes are committed. °7 Instead of a nexus
requirement, the Italian and French statutes extend criminal lia-
bility outside the boundaries of the criminal association to ac-
complices who aid the group.50 8
Congress designed RICO to reach peripheral members of
criminal groups, and did not explicitly limit RICO liability to the
chiefs or managers of a criminal organization.50 9 Congress also
made defendants liable if they manipulated legitimate organiza-
tions, that is, if they committed a pattern of racketeering acts in
connection with the affairs of a legitimate organization."' The
formal distinction made by courts beween outsiders and insiders
should not obscure the importance of the connection between
the racketeering and the enterprise, which Congress required as
the link to RICO liability.511 An accountant outside a corrupt
business, aiding the fraud of the business, should be liable under
the federal RICO statute, as an outsider helping to corrupt a Ne-
apolitan judge is liable under articles 110 and 416bis of the Ital-
ian Penal Code.
The breadth of Anglo-American conspiracy law has ex-
tended liability to peripheral members of criminal conspira-
cies.512 Indeed, despite the low threshold for conspiratorial lia-
bility, the law allows people to aid and abet a conspiracy, blur-
ring the line between insiders and outsiders.5"' As in
conspiracies, the degree of involvement and the mens rea of the
defendant, rather than a formal relationship to an enterprise,
should control RICO liability under § 1962(c).
507. 7 MANZINI supra note 11, at 194-96 (describing membership requirements in
Italian criminal association); Vitu, supra note 22, at 6 (describing membership French
criminal association).
508. See supra notes 345-52 and accompanying text (discussing complicity with Ital-
ian criminal association); supra notes 361-78 (discussing complicity with French crimi-
nal association).
509. See supra note 184 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' concern with
peripheral members of racketeering enterprises); DiSanto, supra note 18, at 1088-89
(noting that while CCE specifically targets leaders of narcotics enterprises, RICO,
passed by same Congress, did not).
510. 18 U.S.C. § 1962.
511. See Clarkin, supra note 213, at 1030-31, 1066-69 (discussing outsiders and
RICO liability).
512. See supra notes 40-98 (discussing breadth of conspiratorial liability).
513. See supra notes 80-98 (discussing complicity with conspiracy).
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CONCLUSION
If RICO is to be applied consistently in the manner in which
it was designed, liability under § 1962(c) should not be limited
by the imposition of a hierarchical requirement and the Reves
test. Italian and French law link accomplice liability to their
criminal association laws. Similarly, liability for participation in
the affairs of a RICO association-in-fact enterprise should extend
beyond those who operate or manage the affairs of the enter-
prise.
